Sultan Mahmood v The Secretary of State for the Home Department

Paragraph S-LTR.1.6. of Appendix FM does not extend to false representations or non-disclosure in a current or previous immigration application. Paragraph S-LTR.4.2. contains two independent and disjunctive grounds. The Secretary of State must identify and give reasons for relying on either or both. Under the first clause, the false representation or non-disclosure must relate to, and support, the previous application; material peripheral to it is insufficient. Under the second clause, a document must have been required for the application or claim, and must have been obtained for that immigration purpose.

The appellant challenged the dismissal of his human-rights appeal by the First-tier Tribunal. He had used another person’s identity and National Insurance number to obtain employment and NHS services, and later relied on employment-related P60 forms as evidence of residence. The Secretary of State refused his fresh claim under paragraph 276ADE of the Immigration Rules, relying on paragraphs S-LTR.1.6. and S-LTR.4.2. The issues were whether those suitability provisions applied to the conduct and documents relied upon, and whether the appellant met the 20-year private-life residence requirement.

1. The appeal was allowed. The First-tier Tribunal’s decision involved an error of law and was set aside under section 12(2)(a) of the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007.
2. Paragraph S-LTR.1.6. is a mandatory ground of refusal when its factual condition is established. It does not, however, cover false representations or failure to disclose material facts in an application for leave to remain or in a previous application for immigration status. The specific provision in paragraph S-LTR.4.2. addressed that previously absent suitability ground.
3. Paragraph S-LTR.4.2. is disjunctive. Its two clauses concern, respectively, false representations or non-disclosure in a previous application or human-rights claim, and false representations made to obtain a document required to support such an application or claim. The Secretary of State must plead and reason reliance on the relevant clause or clauses. If reliance is introduced during an appeal, an addendum decision with adequate reasons and a fair opportunity to respond is required.
4. The first clause requires the false representation or non-disclosure to have been made in support of the previous application. The appellant’s P60 forms were peripheral evidence of residence. He had openly explained that they arose from employment obtained through a false identity. The First-tier Tribunal therefore applied an impermissibly broad interpretation.
5. The second clause requires a compulsory connection between the document and the immigration application or claim. The document must have been obtained for that purpose. The P60 forms were generated through employment and were not required for the paragraph 276ADE(1)(iii) application. The second clause could not therefore apply.
6. The appellant was not caught by the relevant suitability requirements. On the accepted factual findings, he had continuously lived in the United Kingdom for more than 20 years and satisfied paragraph 276ADE(1)(iii). His appeal was allowed on human-rights grounds. A fee award of £140 was made.

• Upper Tribunal (Immigration and Asylum Chamber) set aside the First-tier Tribunal’s decision for material error of law and remade the decision, allowing the appeal on Article 8 grounds.
• First-tier Tribunal dismissed the appellant’s appeal in a decision sent on 14 December 2018.