Hertfordshire County Council & Ors v Secretary of State for Housing, Communities And Local Government

Schedule 12 to the Local Government Act 1972 requires relevant local authority meetings to take place at a single specified geographical location. In that statutory context, attending ordinarily means physically going to that location, and being present ordinarily means physical presence there. The general language of “meeting”, “place”, “attend” and “present” does not justify an updating construction permitting remote meetings. The statutory scheme, the need for certainty about quorum and voting, and Parliament’s later enactment of time-limited remote-meeting powers all point to that conclusion. Whether permanent remote or hybrid meetings should be permitted, and subject to what safeguards, involves legislative policy choices for Parliament.

The claimants sought declarations that the Local Government Act 1972 permitted wholly remote or hybrid local authority meetings in England after the temporary Flexibility Regulations expired on 7 May 2021. The Secretary of State agreed with the substantive interpretation in principle but urged caution about declaratory relief. The claim was transferred by Swift J from Part 8 proceedings in the Queen’s Bench Division to the Administrative Court as a judicial review claim under Part 54. The central issue was whether “meeting”, “place”, “attend” and “present” in Schedule 12 permitted remote participation without further primary legislation.

1. The claim was dismissed. Once the temporary Flexibility Regulations ceased to apply, meetings governed by Schedule 12 to the Local Government Act 1972 had to take place at a single specified geographical location. Attendance ordinarily required physical attendance at that location, and presence required physical presence there (paras [74]-[90]).
2. The meaning of “meeting” had to be determined in its particular statutory context and by reading Schedule 12 as a whole. Its requirements that meetings be held at a place within or outside the authority’s area, and that notice specify the time and place of the intended meeting, naturally referred to a particular geographical location and were inconsistent with a meeting occurring at multiple online or private locations (paras [75]-[78]).
3. The court accepted that the statutory language was relatively general and could in principle support an updating construction. The approach stated in R (ZYN) v Walsall Metropolitan Borough Council was relevant. However, the need for certainty in determining quorum, attendance and voting, together with the distinctive statutory context of local democracy, made an in-person construction preferable (paras [68]-[79]).
4. Section 78 of the Coronavirus Act 2020, read with the Scottish and Welsh legislative examples and the Government’s consultation materials, confirmed that Parliament had legislated on the basis that the 1972 Act did not itself permit remote meetings. Section 78(2) would have been otiose if that power already existed, while section 78(3) made the temporary regulations time-limited (paras [84]-[88]).
5. Byng v London Life Association Ltd concerned a different statutory context and did not control the construction of Schedule 12. The other authorities concerning telephones, the internet, court sittings and conference meetings likewise did not establish the meaning of the 1972 Act in its particular statutory setting. The choice whether to permit remote meetings, and the safeguards governing them, involved policy choices for Parliament, not the courts (paras [80]-[90]).

This was a first-instance Administrative Court claim. It had been issued in the Queen’s Bench Division under Part 8 and was transferred by Swift J on 23 March 2021 to proceed as a judicial review claim under Part 54. The claim was dismissed, subject to further submissions on whether an in-person meeting could be “open to the public” or “held in public” where the public had remote-only access. That issue was not determined in the judgment (paras [42]-[43], [91]-[93]).