Corbett, R (On the Application Of) v The Cornwall Council

The interpretation of planning policy is a question of law, but policy wording need not have one rigid or exclusively literal meaning. The phrase “immediately adjoining” may include land that is next to or very near a settlement. Whether particular land falls within that meaning is ordinarily a matter of planning judgment, having regard to the policy’s language and context.

A physical feature such as a road, stream, hedge or driveway does not necessarily prevent land from immediately adjoining a settlement. A court will intervene only if the decision-maker has misunderstood the policy or otherwise made an error of law. A related policy restricting development in the open countryside cannot add a gloss to, or displace, a policy expressly permitting development immediately adjoining a settlement.

The claimant sought judicial review of the defendant local planning authority’s decision to grant planning permission for a dwelling and garage at Beacon House West, Trevarrian, Cornwall. The relevant development plan policy supported housing on previously developed land within or immediately adjoining a settlement.

The claimant argued that “immediately adjoining” required the development site physically to touch the settlement, without an intervening road, driveway or other feature. He contended that the officer’s report had unlawfully presented the issue as one of planning judgment. Permission to apply for judicial review was initially refused by Lang J on paper, but was later granted on renewal. The central issue was whether the Council had misinterpreted or misapplied Policy 3.

1. Claim dismissed. The officer’s report did not misinterpret or materially mislead the Committee about Policy 3. The Committee properly debated whether the site immediately adjoined Trevarrian.
2. The meaning of planning policy is a question of law. However, the court must seek the sensible meaning of the words in their full policy context and does not construe planning policy with the same linguistic rigour as a statute or contract. Once the policy has been correctly understood, its application to the facts is generally a matter for the decision-maker’s planning judgment.
3. The phrase “immediately adjoining” was not confined to land physically touching the settlement with no intervening feature. The relevant dictionary definitions included “next to” and “very near”. The word “immediately” reinforced the requirement of proximity but did not impose the claimant’s rigid test.
4. Whether a road, driveway, stream, hedge or other feature forms part of a settlement, marks its boundary, or separates a site from it may involve judgment and local knowledge. The question could not be resolved by an inflexible rule that any physical divider necessarily prevented land from immediately adjoining the settlement.
5. Policy 7, concerning new homes in the open countryside, did not preclude the application of Policy 3. Treating Policy 7 as controlling would add a gloss to Policy 3 and prevent development which that policy expressly permitted. Any risk of gradual encroachment into the countryside was a matter for planning judgment.
6. The alternative argument that the site was within the settlement did not form the basis of the officer’s report, the Committee’s consideration or the planning decision. The court therefore determined the claim on the basis on which permission had been granted: that the site immediately adjoined the settlement.

1. High Court (Administrative Court): Lang J refused permission on paper on 20 May 2020. Permission was granted on renewal.
2. High Court (Administrative Court): the claim for judicial review was dismissed by Mrs Justice Jefford DBE.