Russnak-Johnston v Reading Magistrates' Court (Rev 1)

The statutory term “information” in a planning contravention notice may include relevant documents. Whether documents can be required depends on the statutory language, context and purpose. Under Town and Country Planning Act 1990, s.171D(1) creates a continuing offence where a recipient remains in non-compliance after the 21-day period. By contrast, s.171D(5) creates a once-and-for-all offence completed when a false or misleading statement is made with the required knowledge or recklessness. The six-month limit in s.127 of the Magistrates’ Courts Act 1980 runs from commission of the offence and cannot be deferred until the prosecutor obtains sufficient evidence.

The claimant sought judicial review of Reading Magistrates’ Court’s preliminary decision that it had jurisdiction to try four alleged offences under ss.171D(1) and 171D(5) of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990. The proceedings concerned two planning contravention notices served by the Royal Borough of Windsor and Maidenhead.

The first alleged offence concerned failure to provide documents requested by the second notice. The other three alleged offences concerned statements said to be knowingly or recklessly false or misleading. The issues were whether the document request was ultra vires s.171C and whether all four prosecutions complied with the six-month limit in s.127 of the Magistrates’ Courts Act 1980.

1. Issue 1—documents. The challenge to the requirement to provide documents failed. “Information” in s.171C is context-sensitive and may include documents. Sections 171C(2) and (3) permit requirements directed to the use of land, planning permissions, interests in land and the nature and scale of activities. Documents or records may provide the best evidence of those matters. The request for livery agreements and records directly concerned the alleged commercial use and was within the statutory power.
2. The statutory scheme contains safeguards against excessive requirements. A notice must satisfy the statutory precondition, information under s.171C(3) is required only so far as the recipient is able, representations may be made under s.171C(4), and reasonable excuse is a defence under s.171D(3). The document request was therefore not ultra vires.
3. Issue 2—limitation. The Magistrates’ approach was wrong. Section 127 of the Magistrates’ Courts Act 1980 runs from the time when the offence was committed. It does not postpone time until the prosecuting authority has sufficient information. The Woodward and Chesterfield Poultry authorities concerned different statutory schemes and did not alter that conclusion.
4. Whether an offence is continuing depends on the wording and effect of the legislation. Section 171D(1), including the words “at any time after” the compliance period and the charging provisions in s.171D(2), creates an ongoing obligation and a continuing offence until compliance. The prosecution for offence 1 was therefore in time.
5. Section 171D(5) is different. The offence requires proof of knowledge or recklessness when the statement is made. It is completed at that time and is not continuing merely because the statement later proves inaccurate. The prosecutions for offences 2–4 were out of time.
6. The prosecution could proceed for offence 1 but not for offences 2–4. Lord Justice Coulson agreed with Mr Justice Holgate.

The judgment describes a judicial review of a preliminary decision by Reading Magistrates’ Court dated 10 December 2018. Permission was granted by Mostyn J on 8 July 2019. The Divisional Court allowed the challenge in part.