Goodley v The Hut Group Ltd

Where a document has been placed before a judge and specifically referred to in open court, the default position is that access should be permitted under the open justice principle. A non-party has no automatic right of access and must explain how disclosure would advance that principle. The court must conduct a fact-specific proportionality exercise, weighing the purpose and value of disclosure against any risk of harm to the judicial process or the legitimate interests of others. A proper journalistic purpose may advance open justice even where it does not fall neatly within the principal purposes identified in Cape Intermediate Holdings Ltd v Dring [2019] UKSC 38. A contested application of this kind will ordinarily require an oral hearing.

Simon Goodley, a journalist, applied for access to the Project Hydrogen report, which had been placed before Blair J and specifically referred to in the judgment in The Hut Group Ltd v Nobahar-Cookson [2014] EWHC 3842. The report was no longer held by the court but was held by the claimant’s external solicitors.

The application was made under CPR 5.4C(2) and/or the court’s inherent jurisdiction. The claimant accepted that the court had jurisdiction if the open justice principle was engaged, but argued that the request was for current journalistic purposes concerning a historic matter and did not advance open justice. The central issue was whether disclosure of the report for that purpose should be ordered.

1. Application granted. The Project Hydrogen report had been placed before Blair J and specifically referred to as a central finding in his public judgment. The default position was therefore that access should be permitted under the open justice principle.
2. A non-party has no right to disclosure merely because the court has power to permit it. The applicant must explain why access is sought and how it would advance open justice. The court must undertake a fact-specific proportionality exercise, balancing the purpose and potential value of disclosure against any risk of harm to the maintenance of an effective judicial process or to the legitimate interests of others.
3. The purposes of open justice are not confined to the two principal purposes identified in Cape Intermediate Holdings Ltd v Dring [2019] UKSC 38, namely public scrutiny of judicial decision-making and public understanding of how the justice system works. A serious journalistic purpose may advance open justice even where it does not fit neatly within those categories.
4. The authorities, including Chan U Seek v Alvis Vehicles Ltd [2004] EWHC 3092 (Ch), NAB v Serco Ltd [2014] EWHC 1225 and R (Guardian News and Media Ltd) v City of Westminster Magistrates’ Court [2013] QB 618, supported access for a proper journalistic purpose where the document had been referred to in open court.
5. Mr Goodley’s purpose was sufficiently connected with open justice. He sought to understand and report accurately on the findings in the earlier judgment in the context of renewed public interest in the company’s flotation and corporate governance. The age of the judgment did not make the issues stale. The claimant identified no risk of harm to the judicial process or its legitimate interests. Disclosure was therefore ordered in the terms of the draft order.