Ladkin, R (On the Application Of) v Independent Office for Police Conduct

The IOPC’s statutory decision after a death or serious injury investigation is confined principally to whether the report indicates a possible criminal offence or conduct warranting disciplinary proceedings, followed where appropriate by consideration of unsatisfactory performance. The decision-maker need not determine whether police conduct caused or contributed to the death. A decision may be lawful despite concise reasoning if the underlying investigation and material show that the relevant issues were considered and the reasons adequately explain the outcome. In assessing a short, self-authorised pursuit, the decision-maker may take account of its duration, the officers’ training, communications, speed, surrounding circumstances and contemporaneous assessment of risk.

The claimant, the father of Jessica Ladkin, sought judicial review of an IOPC decision following her death in a collision while she was driving away from police officers. The challenge alleged irrationality concerning an officer’s lack of pursuit training, interrupted communication with the control room, proportionality, risk assessment and the failure to consider whether police actions contributed to the death.

The IOPC had concluded that there was no indication of a criminal offence, conduct warranting disciplinary proceedings or unsatisfactory performance. The central issues were whether that conclusion was irrational or inadequately reasoned, and whether the decision-maker was required to determine causation.

1. Claim dismissed. The IOPC decision was not irrational. The investigation had addressed the relevant pursuit guidance and the officers’ actions. The decision-maker’s reference to the officers’ differing training, together with the evidence that the untrained officer switched off the emergency equipment, dropped back and sought a safe opportunity to change drivers, was sufficient to show that the pursuit issue had been considered.
2. The later pursuit began only when the trained officer re-sighted and followed the Corsa. It lasted at most about 50 seconds before the collision. In that fast-moving context, the decision-maker could treat the pursuit as self-authorised and conclude that intermittent communication did not require its discontinuance. The short duration also explained why no formal risk assessment had been articulated to the control room. That did not establish that the officer had given no thought to risk; his evidence addressed road conditions, speed, proximity and vehicle control.
3. The proportionality assessment was a value judgment with wide margins of appreciation. The decision-maker was not required to address every consideration in the APP Guidance expressly. The report and evidence recorded the suspected offences, speed, timing, road conditions, other road users and the officer’s contemporaneous assessment of risk. The concise reasons were adequate and intelligible: they showed why the decision had been reached, applying the principle in South Bucks District Council v Porter [2004] UKHL 33.
4. The statutory scheme required the decision-maker to determine whether the report indicated a possible criminal offence or conduct justifying disciplinary proceedings and, if appropriate, whether a performance matter should be referred. It did not require a determination of causation. Although the investigation considered whether police contact caused or contributed to the death, any wider question of state responsibility and causation could be addressed through the inquest. The Article 2 argument therefore did not make the decision unlawful.