Q (A Child) (DOLS: Lack of Secure Placement)

Where suitable secure accommodation is unavailable, the inherent jurisdiction may authorise a deprivation of liberty in another placement, but the safeguards and structure of Children Act 1989, s 25 must still be applied. The court must determine whether the statutory criteria for secure accommodation are met, whether the proposed restrictions amount to a deprivation of liberty under Article 5, and whether the arrangement is necessary, proportionate and in the child’s best interests. The absence of a secure bed does not justify avoiding those safeguards. Authorisation may be granted for a plainly suboptimal placement only where the evidence establishes that it is presently the least harmful available option, with continuing attention to therapeutic needs, review and transition planning.

A city council applied for a secure accommodation order concerning Q, a 16-year-old child in care with a serious history of harmful sexual behaviour, absconding, violence and offending. No suitable secure placement had been found despite extensive enquiries and repeated court orders. The council therefore sought authority under the inherent jurisdiction to deprive Q of his liberty in a regulated non-secure residential placement.

The central questions were whether Q met the statutory criteria for secure accommodation, whether the proposed restrictions constituted a deprivation of liberty, and whether authorisation in the available placement was lawful, necessary, proportionate and in his best interests.

The application for a secure accommodation order could not be granted because no suitable secure bed was available. The court nevertheless authorised Q’s deprivation of liberty in the identified regulated placement under the inherent jurisdiction.

1. Q plainly satisfied Children Act 1989, s 25(1). He was likely to abscond from other accommodation and was likely to injure himself or others if kept there. The evidence included repeated absconding, harmful sexual behaviour, sexual offending and weapons offences despite intensive supervision.
2. The unavailability of secure accommodation did not remove the statutory safeguards. Applying Re T (Secure Accommodation Order) [2018] EWCA Civ 2136, the structure imposed by s 25 was treated as applying with the same effect to an inherent-jurisdiction application.
3. The approved restrictions were exceptionally severe. They included continuous supervision, waking night supervision, locked accommodation, restrictions on leaving, access to devices and social media, and access to outside space. Q could not consent, was subject to continuous supervision and control, and was not free to leave. The arrangement therefore amounted to a deprivation of liberty for Article 5 purposes.
4. With considerable reservations, the court concluded that authorisation was presently in Q’s best interests. The placement was plainly suboptimal and contained rather than treated his harmful behaviour, but there appeared to be no other available means of keeping him and others safe.
5. Further planning was required. The local authority was directed to consider alternative therapeutic provision, possible re-engagement with G-Map, and pathway planning for Q’s transition from care at 18. The judgment was sent to relevant public bodies because the continuing absence of suitable secure and therapeutic provision raised serious systemic concerns.

First-instance decision. No appellate history is stated in the judgment.