ZK, R (On the Application Of) v Norfolk County Council & Anor

Section 117 of the Mental Health Act 1983 does not impose a general, directly enforceable duty to provide accommodation. Accommodation may fall within after-care services where the statutory requirements are met, but the responsible bodies must assess the individual’s needs and exercise their own judgment.

On judicial review, the court does not substitute its assessment of suitable accommodation for that of the public bodies. A decision may be challenged on ordinary public-law grounds, including irrationality, but disagreement with expert opinions does not establish unlawfulness. The bodies may work with another authority, provided they do not delegate their statutory duty.

The claimant, a woman receiving after-care services under section 117 of the Mental Health Act 1983, was in a rehabilitation unit following hospital treatment. She challenged the defendants’ stated intention to consider discharging her to existing sheltered accommodation in Camden.

She argued that the accommodation was unsuitable, that the defendants had unlawfully reassessed or delegated their duties, had failed to consider relevant professional evidence, had acted irrationally, and had breached article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights. The court considered whether the existing assessment required different accommodation and whether the defendants’ provisional position was unlawful.

1. Permission refused. The claimant’s application for permission to apply for judicial review was dismissed.
2. Section 117 of the Mental Health Act 1983 requires the responsible clinical commissioning group and local social services authority to provide or arrange after-care services for qualifying patients until they are no longer needed. After-care services must meet a need arising from or related to mental disorder and reduce the risk of deterioration or readmission.
3. The statutory provision does not expressly refer to accommodation. Accommodation may nevertheless fall within section 117 after-care in particular circumstances. The court referred to the approach described by Mostyn J in R (Afework) v London Borough of Camden [2013] EWHC 424 (Admin), but did not decide that the stated criteria constituted a binding or exhaustive test.
4. The claimant could not extract the word “suitable” from the January 2020 assessment and use it to require accommodation materially different from that assessment. The assessment identified suitable specialist one-bedroom sheltered accommodation near the claimant’s family, which corresponded to the existing flat.
5. The question whether changed circumstances required different accommodation was for the defendants to assess in the first instance. The court could review that assessment for ordinary public-law errors, including irrationality, but could not pre-empt the defendants’ decision or impose its own view of the accommodation required. The evidence did not make it irrational for the defendants provisionally to regard the flat as suitable pending reassessment.
6. The defendants had taken the claimant’s professional evidence into account. They were not required to provide a detailed response to every item of evidence, and disagreement with professional opinions was not equivalent to failing to consider them.
7. The defendants could work with Camden in seeking accommodation, but could not delegate their section 117 duties. Since they accepted responsibility if Camden could not provide what was required, the delegation ground was academic.
8. The email of 18 March 2021 was part of an ongoing discussion and did not constitute a fresh assessment or decision. The article 8 ground was parasitic upon the unsuccessful section 117 grounds and therefore also failed.