City of London Corporation v Persons Unknown (As Defined In Appendix 1)

A civil claim cannot be brought against an unidentifiable class of potential future wrongdoers merely because some member of that class may later commit a civil wrong. A defendant must be identifiable sufficiently to establish the court’s jurisdiction and to permit service of the claim form. Alternative service under CPR 6.15 is permissible only where the proposed method can reasonably be expected to bring the proceedings to the attention of every defendant within the defined class. A wide injunction regulating the conduct of the public at large is not an appropriate use of inter partes civil litigation. Quia timet relief also requires a sufficiently real and imminent risk of an identified civil wrong, and the proposed order must be proportionate.

The claimant, a local authority and landowner of Epping Forest, issued a Part 8 claim against broadly defined “Persons Unknown”. It sought alternative service of the claim form and an interim injunction restraining activities said to constitute anti-social behaviour and public nuisance across extensive areas of the Forest.

The claim was initially framed under Local Government Act 1972, section 222, with a proposed power of arrest under Police and Justice Act 2006, section 27. During the hearing the claimant accepted that it could not proceed on that basis as local authority for the Forest and reformulated the claim as one by the landowner to restrain threatened public nuisance.

The central issues were whether any defendant could presently be identified and served, whether alternative service could be authorised, and whether the evidence justified a quia timet interim injunction.

1. The applications were refused. The court declined permission for alternative service of the claim form and consequently refused the interim injunction.

2. Service of the claim form is fundamental to establishing jurisdiction over a civil defendant. Under CPR 6.15, alternative service may be ordered only where the proposed method can reasonably be expected to bring the proceedings to the attention of the defendant. The wider the definition of “Persons Unknown”, the more difficult that requirement becomes. The claimant’s proposed notices and website publication could not reasonably notify all persons whose conduct might later fall within the definition.

3. The distinction drawn in Cameron v Liverpool Victoria Insurance Co Ltd [2019] 1 WLR 1471 was decisive. An anonymous but identifiable defendant may be served by an alternative method. A person who is anonymous and cannot presently be identified is a category 2 defendant against whom a civil claim cannot be brought.

4. South Cambridgeshire District Council v Gammell [2006] 1 WLR 658 did not support the claimant’s approach. Its dynamic operation concerning future defendants presupposed that jurisdiction had already been established over defendants by service of the claim form. It did not permit proceedings to be commenced against an entirely contingent class in the hope that defendants might emerge later.

5. The claimant had identified no person presently committing, or credibly threatening, a tort or other civil wrong. The evidence did not establish a sufficiently real and imminent risk of public nuisance to justify quia timet relief, applying Canada Goose v Persons Unknown [2020] 1 WLR 2802. Much of the conduct relied on was not shown to amount to public nuisance, and the proposed injunction would restrain conduct that was not likely to do so.

6. The proposed order would operate, in practical terms, as a contra mundum injunction regulating the conduct of millions of visitors. That was not an appropriate use of civil litigation. The civil courts determine disputes between parties concerning proved or threatened civil wrongs; they do not legislate generally for public conduct. A targeted claim against identified defendants and actual or threatened acts of public nuisance would be the appropriate course.