Sensar Ltd & Anor, R (On the Application Of) v Chief Land Registrar

A Registrar’s decision that an objection is not groundless is ordinarily a low-threshold gateway decision, with the underlying dispute reserved for the First-tier Tribunal. Fairness will not usually require reasons or representations from the applicant before that decision. Exceptional circumstances may nevertheless require reasons and an opportunity to respond, particularly where the Registrar has previously engaged in a detailed process and changes a provisional view. An objection is not groundless if the relevant contractual and statutory issues are reasonably arguable. Where one application seeks restrictions and an objection is made to it, the Registrar may be unable to determine any part of the application until the objection is resolved. Procedural unfairness does not necessarily justify relief where the outcome would highly likely have been the same.

The claimants applied for restrictions under the Land Registration Act 2002 in relation to land subject to joint venture agreements. Purchasers of some plots objected. The Chief Land Registrar initially considered the objections groundless, but later decided that they were not groundless and referred the dispute to the First-tier Tribunal.

The claimants challenged that decision on six grounds, including failure to give reasons, irrationality, failure to register restrictions for unobjectionable plots, procedural unfairness, improper notification and breach of an earlier order requiring independent reconsideration. The central issues were whether the objections were properly regarded as arguable, whether the application could be partly determined, and whether the decision-making process was lawful.

1. Outcome. The claim succeeded only to a limited extent. The Registrar was in breach of a duty to give reasons for the decision and breached procedural fairness by not allowing the claimants to respond to the further objections before deciding that they were not groundless. No relief was granted on either breach. The remaining grounds failed.
2. Groundless objections. The statutory threshold is very low. An objection is groundless only if it is bound to fail. The question whether the joint venture agreements themselves required consent before disposition, or merely required registration of a charge which would have produced that consequence, was reasonably arguable. The same applied to the argument that a prior failure to register the charge made the subsequent disposition unlawful. Those issues belonged to the First-tier Tribunal.
3. Reasons and fairness. Ordinarily, fairness does not require reasons for a decision that an objection is not groundless, because it is a gateway decision which does not determine the underlying dispute. In this exceptional case, the long history, the earlier judicial review, the Registrar’s detailed provisional reasoning and the change of position made reasons and an opportunity to respond necessary. The later reasons were accepted as genuine, and the claimants suffered no substantial prejudice. Relief was refused under section 31(2A) of the Senior Courts Act 1981.
4. Single application. The application was one application for a single compendious restriction. On the proper construction of section 73(5)(b) of the Land Registration Act 2002, “the application” meant the application as a whole. The Registrar therefore had no power to determine restrictions for plots 2, 4, 7 and 8 while the Nyland objections remained unresolved. Even if a discretion existed, refusing to proceed was not irrational because the claimants’ priority was protected by the day-list entry.
5. Notification and independence. Section 45(1)(b) and rule 17 permitted notification to persons potentially affected by the application. Giving notice to the purchasers, extending their time and allowing further representations were lawful exercises of discretion. The fresh decision was made by a senior land registrar with no previous involvement, as required by the earlier order; the order did not require an entirely new team or office.

First instance judicial review. The judgment refers to an earlier judicial review in which HH Judge Barker QC quashed the July 2016 decision and remitted the application to the Chief Land Registrar for reconsideration. The present claim challenged the subsequent decision dated 26 July 2018.