K (Children)

Adoption is justified only where it is necessary and proportionate, meaning that no other arrangement is likely to meet the child’s lifelong welfare needs. In assessing whether rehabilitation should be attempted, the court must evaluate the nature and likelihood of future harm, the parents’ capacity to provide safe and stable care, the prospects of therapeutic change, and the consequences of further delay. Sustained dishonesty, evasion of professional involvement and lack of insight may themselves constitute a real risk of significant harm where they would expose children to instability, flight, inconsistent care and failure to prioritise their needs. A proposed therapy must offer a realistic prospect of enduring change within the children’s timescales.

This was a rehearing of welfare decisions concerning three children. Keehan J had made findings of extensive parental dishonesty, concealment of the children and attempts to evade the authorities, and had made care and placement for adoption orders. The Court of Appeal set aside the welfare determination because the risk of future harm had not been properly identified and remitted the matter for redetermination; the factual findings were not challenged.

The parents sought an adjournment to undertake couple therapy, relying on a psychological assessment suggesting that change might be possible. The local authority and children’s guardian supported immediate adoption. The central issue was whether the prospect of therapy justified delaying the children’s permanent placement.

1. Outcome. Full care orders and placement for adoption orders were made for all three children. The court dispensed with the parents’ consent because the welfare of each child required it.
2. The court applied the welfare provisions of the Children Act 1989 and the Adoption and Children Act 2002. Adoption is the most draconian intervention in family life and is proportionate only where no other arrangement is likely to meet the child’s lifelong welfare needs. The relevant evaluation principally concerned the harm suffered or likely to be suffered and the parents’ ability and willingness to provide a safe and secure home.
3. The past physical injury and domestic-abuse incidents, viewed alone, were unlikely to justify permanent removal. The decisive concern was the sustained, multi-layered dishonesty and evasion. If the children returned home, they were likely to face flight from the jurisdiction, unstable accommodation, inconsistent access to health care and education, exposure to domestic abuse, non-cooperation with professionals, and parents unable to prioritise their needs. Those features amounted to a real risk of significant harm.
4. The parents’ attendance at psychological assessment and discussions with the guardian were positive changes, but their responses to the adverse findings remained minimal and self-serving. Their continuing dishonesty and lack of insight gave no realistic basis for believing that a single course of therapy could produce the enduring change required for safe parenting. Further delay would itself prejudice the children and would not be justified by a merely theoretical prospect of success.
5. The court therefore concluded that the parents lacked current capacity to provide sufficiently safe, stable and nurturing care, that therapy did not offer a realistic prospect of reversing that position within the children’s timescales, and that adoption was the only option by which their lifelong welfare needs could safely be met.

• Court of Appeal: Allowed the parents’ appeal against Keehan J’s welfare determination and remitted the matter for redetermination because the risk of future harm had not been properly identified. The factual findings were left undisturbed.
• High Court (Family Division): On rehearing, upheld the adoption plan on an independent welfare analysis and made care and placement for adoption orders.