Harvey v Director of Public Prosecutions

Section 142(2) of the Magistrates’ Courts Act 1980 is a limited power to correct mistakes or errors in a magistrates’ court’s own proceedings. It is not a general power of review or a substitute for an appeal. Once the Crown Court has sentenced a defendant, the magistrates’ court cannot use section 142(2) to vacate a guilty plea or set aside the Crown Court’s sentence. A defendant’s later decision that a defence should have been advanced, including a modern slavery or self-defence argument, is not ordinarily a mistake within the section. The same limits apply to adults and persons under 18.

The appellant had pleaded guilty in the Youth Court to offences including possession of a bladed article and possession of controlled drugs with intent to supply. He was committed to the Crown Court for sentence. After a later National Referral Mechanism assessment concluded that he had been a victim of modern slavery, and after his acquittal on unrelated later charges where a section 45 defence was advanced, he applied under section 142(2) of the Magistrates’ Courts Act 1980 to vacate his earlier guilty pleas.

The District Judge refused the application and stated a case for the High Court. The questions were whether section 142(2) permitted a guilty plea to be vacated after Crown Court sentence and whether refusal was correct in the circumstances.

1. Appeal dismissed. The Magistrates’ Court had no power under section 142(2) of the Magistrates’ Courts Act 1980 to vacate the appellant’s guilty pleas after he had been sentenced in the Crown Court. The District Judge was correct to refuse the application.
2. Section 142 is directed to correcting mistakes and errors in the Magistrates’ Court. It is a limited slip-rule power, not a general power of review and not a function equivalent to an appeal to the Crown Court or the High Court. Section 142(1A) and section 142(3) reinforce the statutory separation between orders made by the Magistrates’ Court and decisions made by the Crown Court or High Court.
3. The words in section 142(3) referring to the conviction and any sentence or order imposed in consequence mean, in this statutory scheme, the conviction, sentence or order of the Magistrates’ Court. Parliament did not intend the provision to enable a Magistrates’ Court to set aside a sentence imposed by the Crown Court or the Court of Appeal Criminal Division.
4. The reasoning in R v RD was part of that court’s decision, rather than obiter. It established that section 142(2) has no application once the Crown Court has passed sentence. The principle applies whether the defendant is an adult or under 18.
5. A failure to adduce evidence or pursue a defence which is later said to have been available, including a modern slavery or self-defence defence, is not a mistake or error within section 142(2). Such an application would amount to an attempt to obtain a rehearing as a substitute for an appeal. The statutory route available after an unequivocal guilty plea is an application to the Criminal Cases Review Commission.
6. The appeal by case stated is confined to the Case Stated. Extrinsic factual and documentary material should not be produced, consistently with Part 35.3(4) of the Criminal Procedure Rules 2020.

• High Court (Administrative Court): The appeal by way of case stated from the District Judge’s refusal at Margate Magistrates’ Court was dismissed. The court answered both questions against the appellant.