U, R (on the application of) v Hackney London Borough Council

Permission for judicial review may be refused where an established complaints mechanism is an appropriate and effective route for resolving the claimant’s concerns, including disputed facts, substance and procedure.

The court should consider the practical position at the permission stage. A complaints mechanism may address the adequacy of investigations, communications, guidance, alleged promises and the merits of the authority’s conduct. Judicial review is supervisory and is not ordinarily a suitable vehicle for detailed fact-finding or cross-examination where the alternative mechanism can properly evaluate the issues.

Proceedings should not be stayed merely to leave them available while the complaints process is pursued. The judicial review claim may be brought to an end, leaving any future public law issue to be considered if and when it arises.

The claimant challenged the defendant local authority’s decision to invoke a Child Protection Plan and enter information on the Child Neglect Register. She relied on alleged legitimate expectations, an alleged breach of the statutory investigation duty under the Children Act 1989, and alleged procedural failures concerning an Initial Child Protection Conference.

The defendant submitted that the statutory complaints mechanism was the appropriate alternative remedy. The claimant disputed its suitability, sought permission for judicial review and proposed that factual disputes be resolved through oral evidence and cross-examination.

The central issue was whether judicial review should proceed, or whether the claimant should first use the complaints mechanism.

1. Permission refused. The statutory complaints mechanism was the appropriate forum for the claimant’s complaints about the way the local authority had handled the case, including factual issues and criticisms of substance and procedure.
2. The conclusion was strengthened by the claimant’s own emphasis on earlier complaints and alleged failures to deal with them. The mechanism remained available, and the defendant had confirmed that complaints would be fully investigated in accordance with the procedure. Any earlier uncertainty about whether particular communications should have been treated as complaints did not prevent the mechanism from addressing the matters now raised.
3. The complaints mechanism could examine the facts, the adequacy of steps taken, communications, application of guidance, alleged promises and any justification for failing to keep them. It could also address relevant underlying questions touching on the merits. Judicial review was not a suitable vehicle for resolving those issues on the papers or through fact-finding and cross-examination.
4. The court’s jurisdiction was supervisory. It would not second-guess the local authority, which had primary responsibility for important child-welfare decisions. The statutory context included the duty under section 47 of the Children Act 1989 and the various courses open to a local authority.
5. A stay was refused. The complaints mechanism was the proper route, and the present proceedings were not an appropriate vehicle to be left pending while that route was pursued. Any future public law issue arising from a later decision would have to be considered separately.
6. The defendant’s application for costs was refused. In the circumstances, it was not just to order recovery of costs when the initial summary grounds had not adequately explained the complaints mechanism or assisted the court on the alternative-remedy issue.

Not an appeal. The judgment determined an application for permission for judicial review.