NATIONAL HIGHWAYS LIMITED v LOUIS LANCASTER

Where a protestor deliberately breaches a clearly expressed court order, the court must enforce the order even where the protest is peaceful and motivated by conscientious beliefs. The criminal standard of proof applies to contempt. The court must assess culpability and harm by reference to criminal sentencing principles, impose the shortest custodial term that properly reflects the seriousness of the contempt, and then consider suspension. Articles 10 and 11 rights are relevant to the sanction, but do not reopen the balance already struck when the order was made. An unequivocal undertaking of future compliance may justify suspension, but only narrowly where the contempt remains serious and flagrant.

National Highways Limited applied under CPR 81 for the committal of Louise Lancaster for deliberately breaching an injunction made by Bennathan J in these proceedings and related claims. The order prohibited protestors from obstructing or endangering the free flow of traffic on the M25, affixing themselves to roads or objects, and entering restricted parts of the roads on foot.

Lancaster admitted valid service, breach, and contempt. The breach arose from a protest on a gantry over the M25 which caused the motorway to close for several hours and substantial traffic disruption. Criminal proceedings arising from the same incident were pending. The issues were whether the civil contempt proceedings should proceed and, if so, what sanction and costs order should be imposed.

1. Contempt established. The defendant admitted that she had been validly served with the order and had deliberately breached it by entering the M25 on foot, accessing and remaining on a gantry, affixing a banner, and thereby preventing or endangering the free flow of traffic. The court was sure of the contempt.
2. Proceeding despite criminal proceedings. Civil contempt proceedings and criminal proceedings are distinct. The civil application should proceed where there was no risk of prejudice and the maximum civil penalty would not be manifestly discrepant with any potential criminal sentence. Regard had to be given to the principle against double punishment and to the need for any later criminal court to take the civil sentence into account.
3. Rights and obedience to orders. Articles 10 and 11 were engaged, but the relevant balance between protest rights and the public’s right to use the highway had already been struck when the injunction was made. The defendant could not unilaterally decide that her cause justified non-compliance. Court orders had to be obeyed unless set aside or successfully challenged.
4. Sanction. The aims of contempt sanctions were punishment, securing compliance, and rehabilitation. Criminal sentencing principles required assessment of culpability and harm. The deliberate breach, foreseeable risk, prolonged closure, extensive queues, and significant public disruption meant that custody was the least sufficient sanction. The starting point was four months, reduced for the early admission, prison conditions, and nine days spent on remand, producing 42 days’ imprisonment.
5. Suspension and costs. The sentence was suspended for two years because of the defendant’s unequivocal statement that she would comply with the order. Any further breach would risk immediate activation and an additional sentence. The claimant was awarded £22,000 in costs under CPR 44, the court finding the sum sought disproportionate but rejecting the alleged chilling effect.

First-instance High Court decision. The judgment states that any appeal lies to the Court of Appeal and does not require permission.