Taxidiotiki-Touristiki-Nautiliaki Limited (t/a Aspida Travel) v Columbus, Owners and or Demise Charterers of the Vessel 'Columbus'

For a statutory action in rem under section 21(4) of the Senior Courts Act 1981, the relevant person must have been liable in personam when the cause of action arose and must satisfy the statutory ownership or demise-charterer condition when proceedings are brought. A later assurance, estoppel, judicial sale, or unexercised purchase option cannot create jurisdiction where those requirements are absent. A claim can attach to sale proceeds only if it was a valid in rem claim immediately before the sale. Common law termination rights remain available unless clearly excluded by contract. Where a demise charterer has abandoned the vessel and the owner has resumed possession and control, contractual notice provisions may not apply.

Aspida Travel sought default judgment in two claims against the proceeds of sale of the vessels Vasco Da Gama and Columbus. The claims concerned travel agency services, including crew repatriation. The vessels had been demise chartered to Mythic Cruise Ltd and Lyric Cruise Ltd, but those charters were terminated before Aspida issued its claims.

The Salvus Claimants and Carnival Plc objected that the claims did not satisfy section 21(4) of the Senior Courts Act 1981. Aspida also advanced arguments based on assurances, invalid termination, existing in rem rights, equitable ownership, and possible personal liability of Carnival.

1. Vessel claims. Default judgment was refused in respect of the claims against the sale proceeds. Section 21(4) required the relevant person to have been the person liable in personam when the causes of action arose and, when the actions were brought, to be the beneficial owner of all the shares in the ship or its demise charterer. Mythic and Lyric no longer satisfied the latter condition when the claims were issued.
2. Aspida’s reliance on Carnival’s communications failed. The communications did not amount to an open-ended assurance, there was no reliance, and an assurance could not confer statutory jurisdiction where section 21(4) was not satisfied. The principle against approbating and reprobating, discussed in Express Newspapers Plc v News (UK) Ltd & Ors [1990] 1 WLR 1320, did not assist.
3. The charters had been validly terminated. Clause 22 did not clearly exclude common law remedies, applying the approach in Gilbert-Ash (Northern) Ltd v Modern Engineering (Bristol) Ltd [1974] AC 689. In any event, the charterers’ abandonment was a clear repudiation or renunciation outside the categories contemplated by clause 22. Carnival had already resumed possession and control through protective managers, so the contractual relationship could not sensibly be treated as continuing.
4. The principle described in The Sanko Mineral [2014] EWHC 3927 (Admlty) did not assist. A claim could be enforced against sale proceeds only where the claimant had a valid in rem claim satisfying section 21(4) immediately before the sale. Aspida did not.
5. The claims alleging Carnival’s personal liability, apparent authority, and duties concerning crew repatriation were adjourned. Carnival had not received a proper opportunity to respond, and those issues required evidence and consideration of English and Bahamian law and the Maritime Labour Convention.