A CITY COUNCIL v MOTHER

A local authority may be restrained under the inherent jurisdiction from consulting or informing a parent with parental responsibility about a child in care only in exceptional circumstances. The court must balance the parent’s Article 8 rights against the welfare of the child and the rights of the child and other family members. The assessment may include the effect on the child of exposing another parent to a serious and justified risk of violence. Where the parent’s involvement in the child’s life has been negligible and the parent has caused serious domestic violence, little weight may be given to that parent’s family-life rights.

The local authority applied for a final care order concerning a 13-year-old child with significant developmental and behavioural difficulties. The order was agreed. The mother sought an injunction preventing the local authority from consulting or informing the father about matters concerning the child. The father had parental responsibility but had not seen the child since infancy, had committed serious violence against the mother and another partner, and was serving a life sentence. The central issues were whether the statutory duties under the Children Act 1989 should be displaced and whether contact with the father should be prevented.

1. Consultation and disclosure. The court ordered the local authority not to consult or inform the father about any matters concerning the child. If circumstances changed, the local authority was required to apply to the court for variation.
2. Exceptional circumstances. The statutory duties to consult parents under sections 22 and 26 of the Children Act 1989 are broad. Relief dispensing with those duties is exceptional. The court balanced the father’s Article 8 and Article 6 rights against the child’s welfare and the mother’s rights under Articles 2 and 3.
3. Domestic abuse. The court could consider the physical and emotional harm to the child resulting from placing the mother at risk of serious assault, or exposing her to a genuine fear of such harm, even without evidence of a direct threat to the child.
4. Contact. The child’s expressed wish for contact did not establish an informed choice. Given her age, diagnoses and emotional immaturity, she was not Gillick competent in relation to contact decisions. Contact, including indirect or highly managed contact, was not in her interests at that time.
5. Care order. The threshold was crossed and a care order was made by agreement.