David Anthony Hinkel v Simmons & Simmons LLP

The jurisdiction to reopen a finally determined appeal under CPR 52.30 is exceptionally narrow. It requires real injustice, exceptional circumstances, no alternative effective remedy, and a powerful probability that the original decision would have been different if the integrity of the proceedings had not been undermined. Fresh evidence, an allegedly wrong result, or the importance of the issue is insufficient by itself.

The Money Laundering Regulations do not create civil liability to third parties. Any liability must arise under the general law. A judge’s professional background, previous decisions, or prior dealings with a party will not ordinarily establish apparent bias. Medical evidence relied on for an adjournment must particularise the condition, its effect on participation, and the prognosis.

The appellant claimed damages from Simmons & Simmons LLP arising from a failed proposed acquisition of property owned by the Republic of Iran. The Central London County Court entered summary judgment for the respondent, holding that the fraud allegation was inadequately pleaded and unsupported by the evidence.

Permission to appeal was refused. The appellant subsequently made eight applications, seeking principally to reopen the appeal under CPR 52.30, introduce new evidence, defer the hearing, recuse the judge, and obtain an adjournment on medical grounds. The central issues were whether the appeal could properly be reopened, whether alleged breaches of the Money Laundering Regulations assisted the appellant, and whether recusal or adjournment was justified.

1. Reopening the appeal. All applications were dismissed. CPR 52.30 confers a very narrow jurisdiction. The applicant must show real injustice, exceptional circumstances making reopening appropriate, and no alternative effective remedy. The injustice must be sufficiently grave to overcome the public importance of finality in litigation. There must also be a powerful probability that the earlier decision would have been different had the integrity of the proceedings not been critically undermined: Taylor v Lawrence [2003] Q.B. 528; Lawal v Circle 33 Housing Trust [2015] H.L.R. 9; R. (Goring-On-Thames Parish Council) v South Oxfordshire DC [2018] 1 WLR 5161.
2. Fresh evidence, the possibility that the earlier result was wrong, or the importance of the issue does not itself justify reopening. The appellant’s new complaints and documents either were, or could have been, available earlier, or did not undermine the integrity of the original proceedings.
3. Money laundering allegations. Even if the Money Laundering Regulations had been breached, they did not create a statutory civil claim by a third-party purchaser against solicitors. Liability had to be established under the general law: P&P Property Ltd v Owen White [2018] EWCA Civ. 1082. The appellant had failed to establish fraud, and there was no sufficient basis for a negligence claim because no duty of care had been assumed.
4. A claim for breach of warranty of authority would require proof of reliance. Reliance was a question of fact, and the lower court was entitled to find that the evidence did not substantiate it. Dishonesty could not be inferred where the evidence was equally consistent with negligence or the solicitors themselves having been deceived: Three Rivers DC v The Governor and Company of the Bank of England (No. 3) [2001] UKHL 16.
5. Recusal and adjournment. Applying the fair-minded and informed observer test, the judge’s professional background, previous decisions, or alleged contact with persons connected with the respondent did not create a real possibility of bias: Porter v McGill [2001] UKHL 67; Locabail (UK) Ltd v Bayfield Properties Ltd [2000] 1 QB 480. The medical certificates were inadequate because they did not explain with particularity why the appellant could not participate or provide a reasoned prognosis. The court was entitled to weigh them with the whole procedural history and continue in the appellant’s absence.
6. The First to Sixth Applications were dismissed as totally without merit. The Seventh Application for recusal was dismissed on the same basis.

• High Court, Chancery Appeals: The court dismissed the appellant’s applications to reopen or otherwise revisit the final determination of his appeal. The underlying County Court order was the summary judgment of HHJ Dight dated 10 March 2020.
• Earlier High Court decision: Permission to appeal was refused on the papers and again after an oral renewal, with written reasons dated 15 January 2021 in [2021] EWHC 55 (Ch). That decision was not reopened.