Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis v Meekey

Where conversion of goods has occurred and the limitation period has expired, section 3(2) of the Limitation Act 1980 extinguishes the owner’s title. That consequence applies generally and may determine whether an applicant is the owner for the purposes of section 1(1) of the Police (Property) Act 1897.

Conversion requires an unequivocal demand for return and an unequivocal refusal. Later negotiations do not undo the conversion or restart limitation unless they establish an agreement or representation extending time. Possession of firearms may include control exercised through an agent, even where the prohibited person lacks physical custody. On a case stated, the court asks whether the lower court was entitled to reach its factual conclusion on the evidence.

Following his conviction for firearms offences, Paul Meekey applied under section 1(1) of the Police (Property) Act 1897 for the return of firearms seized by the Metropolitan Police, proposing delivery to a registered firearms dealer as his agent. The Commissioner separately applied under section 52(4) of the Firearms Act 1968 for destruction of the firearms.

The Deputy Senior District Judge allowed Mr Meekey’s application and refused the destruction application. The Commissioner obtained a case stated raising four questions concerning limitation, ownership, and the evidential basis for the section 52(4) power. The central issues were whether Mr Meekey’s title had been extinguished, whether the proposed arrangement would contravene section 21(1) of the Firearms Act 1968, and whether the evidence established seizure under that Act.

1. Questions 1–3. The appeal on Mr Meekey’s application under section 1(1) of the Police (Property) Act 1897 succeeded. Section 3(2) of the Limitation Act 1980 operates as part of the general law. It therefore applies when ownership is relevant to an application under the 1897 Act, even though that application is not itself a tort claim.
2. Mr Meekey’s solicitors’ letter of 23 June 2009 amounted to an unequivocal demand for return of the firearms. The Commissioner’s letter of 22 February 2010 was an unequivocal refusal. That refusal constituted conversion and started the limitation period. The later correspondence in 2014 and 2015 represented attempts to broker a compromise. It did not undo the conversion. Nor did it establish an agreement or representation extending time or creating an estoppel.
3. The consequence was that section 3(2) had extinguished Mr Meekey’s title before his application. The lower court had therefore allowed the application on an incorrect premise, and its decision was set aside.
4. There was an independent reason why no order under the 1897 Act should have been made. The concept of possession in section 21(1) of the Firearms Act 1968 is not confined to physical custody. Applying the reasoning in Sullivan v Earl of Caithness [1976] QB 966, and the approach confirmed in R v North [2001] EWCA Crim 544, Mr Meekey would retain control over firearms held by Mr Gordon at his direction. The proposed order would therefore offend section 21(1).
5. Question 4. The lower court’s alternative conclusion concerning section 52(4) of the Firearms Act 1968 involved no error of law. On a case stated limited to questions of law, the issue was whether the judge was entitled on the evidence to conclude that the firearms had not been seized under powers in the 1968 Act. The Commissioner had provided no evidence identifying the legal power used in the search. That evidential conclusion was open to the judge.
6. The lower court’s primary discretionary conclusion on destruction could not stand because it depended on the incorrect premise of Mr Meekey’s ownership. The destruction application required reconsideration. A fresh application remained possible if the evidential defect concerning the statutory seizure power could be remedied.

• Westminster Magistrates’ Court: Deputy Senior District Judge Ikram allowed Mr Meekey’s application under section 1(1) of the Police (Property) Act 1897 and refused the Commissioner’s application under section 52(4) of the Firearms Act 1968.
• High Court (Administrative Court): The court answered Questions 1–3 in the negative and Question 4 in the affirmative. It set aside the order favouring Mr Meekey, held that the primary destruction decision could not stand, and left the alternative evidential conclusion intact.