Various Claimants v G4S Plc

Separate claimants cannot generally be added to an issued but unserved claim form under CPR 17.1, which permits an existing party to amend its own statement of case. A challenge to an impermissible purported amendment may be made under CPR 3.4 and is not confined to CPR 17.2. Where CPR 17.2 applies, its 14-day period is mandatory, subject to relief from sanctions. An arguable limitation defence is sufficient to justify refusing an amendment which falls outside the permitted post-limitation exceptions. A mistake as to the name of a party is distinct from a mistake as to identity. The court may correct a genuine naming mistake only where the applicable rule is satisfied and discretion favours amendment. Pre-2011 claims based on different statements, purchases and market effects did not arise from substantially the same facts as the pleaded post-2011 claim.

The original claimants brought proceedings under section 90A of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 concerning alleged misrepresentations by G4S and losses on G4S shares. The claim form was issued on 10 July 2019, shortly before an arguably applicable limitation deadline, and was amended repeatedly before service to add and remove claimants. After service, G4S applied to challenge the added claimants, the identification of other claimants and claims concerning statements made before 2011. The claimants applied to amend the claim form to correct names and extend the claim period. The central issues were the scope of CPR 17.1, the effect of limitation on amendments, the consent requirement for added claimants, the distinction between mistakes of name and identity, and whether the earlier claims arose from substantially the same facts.

1. Added claimants. CPR 17.1 permits an existing party to amend its own statement of case. It does not permit that party to introduce a different person bringing a separate and distinct claim. The attempted joinder of the additional claimants was therefore outside CPR 17.1 and was liable to be struck out.
2. Challenge and limitation. A challenge that the purported step was not an amendment permitted by CPR 17.1 could be made under CPR 3.4. If, contrary to the court’s construction, CPR 17.1 permitted the joinder, CPR 17.1 and 17.2 formed a complete code and the 14-day period in rule 17.2(2) applied. G4S was granted relief from sanctions because the substantive limitation challenge had been raised within eight weeks, the default was not deliberate, and refusal would disproportionately deprive G4S of an arguable limitation defence. The added claimants’ joinder was then disallowed because the amendments were made after an arguable expiry of limitation.
3. Consent. CPR 19.4(4) applies to pre-service as well as post-service joinder. It requires a prior filed written consent. The amended claim form was not a sufficient separate consent document, and a solicitor’s signature did not satisfy the applicable authority as established in Kay v Dowzall. The additional claimants therefore also failed for want of consent.
4. Misnamed claimants. CPR 17.4(3) concerns a genuine mistake as to name, not identity, and requires that the mistake cause no reasonable doubt as to the party’s identity. CPR 19.5(3)(a) applies more broadly where a party is substituted for one named in mistake, but the mistake must still be a naming mistake in the generously interpreted sense recognised by the authorities. CPR 19.5(3)(b) is directed principally to locus standi errors and cannot be used generally to cure every mistake which would otherwise defeat a claim.
5. Discretion. The court exercised its discretion against the proposed amendments, save for the straightforward historic change of the Allianz entity’s name. The decisive factors included the late issue of proceedings, the large number of mistakes, the claimants’ failure to understand their own structures, the absence of prior notification, the reasonable doubt as to identity and the delayed applications.
6. 2011 point. The pre-2011 claims required investigation of different statements, market effects, purchases and holding decisions. They did not arise from the same or substantially the same facts as the post-2011 claim under CPR 17.4(2). Those allegations were struck out and permission to amend was refused.

First-instance decision. The judgment itself does not state any prior appellate history.