Z (A Child), Re (2nd Judgment) (Rev 1)

In care proceedings, further litigation of threshold issues may be disproportionate where all parties accept that a final care order is necessary and the proposed basis is sufficient. The court should consider the child’s welfare, wishes and feelings, and the practical consequences of delay. A care plan need not prescribe future contact and rehabilitation with excessive precision where the child’s circumstances are likely to fluctuate. Once a care order is made, implementation of the care plan is generally for the local authority, subject to the court’s statutory functions, including approval of permanence provisions and contact arrangements under unknown section 34(11). A deprivation of liberty order should last no longer than necessary and may appropriately be reviewed after a shorter period where recent improvement gives the child a realistic focus for progress.

This was the second judgment in care proceedings concerning a 13-year-old child who had previously required secure accommodation and a deprivation of liberty order. The earlier judgment, London Borough of Sutton v X, Y and Z (DOLS: Lack of Secure Placement) [2020] EWHC 1827 (Fam), concerned the absence of a suitable secure placement.

Following substantial improvement, the local authority discontinued its earlier application but later sought a final care order and a renewed deprivation of liberty order after further absconding, intoxication and challenging behaviour. The parents accepted the threshold on a pragmatic basis. The central issues were whether further litigation or adjournment was justified, whether the final care plan was sufficiently clear, and the appropriate duration of the deprivation of liberty order.

1. Final care order. Further delay was inimical to the child’s welfare. All parties agreed that a care order was required, and the parents’ proposals provided a sufficient basis for accepting that the threshold was met. Further litigation would cause stress, might damage family relationships, and was unlikely to produce a materially different care plan. The court therefore made the final care order after considering and approving the final care plan.

2. Care plan. The child’s progress, wishes and feelings, contact and prospects of rehabilitation were liable to ebb and flow. The care plan therefore could not realistically be written with excessive precision. Once a care order was accepted to be in the child’s best interests, decisions about the placement and its day-to-day implementation were for the local authority, taking account of parental views and the child’s welfare. The court retained its statutory functions, including approval of permanence provisions and contact arrangements pursuant to unknown section 34(11).

3. Deprivation of liberty. Recent absconding and exposure to significant harm demonstrated that a deprivation of liberty order remained necessary. Although the local authority sought six months, a three-month order was proportionate. The order should be reviewed then, both because the recent deterioration followed a period of improvement and because a shorter review period could give the child hope and a practical objective.