Medical Care Clinics Limited v Whitestone Solicitors

An appellate court should interfere with a case-management decision only where there has been a misdirection or the decision falls outside the generous ambit of reasonable disagreement. A pleading must identify the material facts relied upon, including the alleged breaches, the relevant transactions, dates and consequences. Where a party has been given a final opportunity to remedy serious pleading deficiencies and fails to do so, refusing permission to amend and striking out the statement of case may fall squarely within the trial judge’s discretion. The fact that a fair trial might eventually be possible does not prevent strike-out where the existing pleading is likely to obstruct the just disposal of the proceedings.

The Applicant claimed payment of invoices under an agreement concerning rehabilitation referrals. The County Court ordered the Applicant to apply for permission to amend its particulars of claim and made an unless order following concerns about the inadequacy of the pleading.

The Applicant’s amended pleading remained unclear about the alleged breaches, the referrals to which they related, the duties said to have been breached, the relevant dates and the consequences claimed. HHJ Sephton QC refused permission to amend, struck out the statement of case under CPR 3.4(2)(b), and made costs orders. Turner J refused permission to appeal on the papers. The Applicant renewed that application before the High Court.

1. Application refused. The proposed appeal had no realistic prospect of success.
2. The challenge concerned a case-management decision. Applying Global Torch Ltd v Apex Global Management Ltd [2014] UKSC 64, [2014] 1 WLR 4495, the appellate court should not interfere absent a misdirection or a decision plainly outside the generous ambit within which reasonable decision-makers may disagree. The Applicant also had to satisfy the real-prospect requirement in CPR 52.6(1)(a).
3. The original and amended pleadings failed to particularise the alleged breaches. They did not identify the breaches relied upon, the referrals concerned, the duties said to have been breached, the dates, or the circumstances and consequences. The amended pleading therefore did not cure the essential deficiency.
4. The County Court judge had considered the overriding objective, proportionality, the available procedural alternatives and the consequences of refusing amendment. The refusal was a permissible exercise of discretion after the Applicant had been given a final opportunity to put its case in order. Further information under CPR 18.1, further amendment, sanctions or partial strike-out were not required.
5. The strike-out was based on CPR 3.4(2)(b), namely that the statement of case was likely to obstruct the just disposal of the proceedings. It was not based on CPR 3.4(2)(a), and the judge had not found that the claim had no reasonable prospect of success. The possibility that a fair trial might eventually be achieved with further particularisation did not make strike-out impermissible.
6. The costs order was also unassailable. The Applicant had not resisted the order in principle below and had sought detailed assessment. There was no realistic prospect of overturning the judge’s exercise of discretion.

1. High Court (Queen’s Bench Division): renewed application for permission to appeal refused; the proposed appeal had no realistic prospect of success.
2. Manchester County Court: HHJ Sephton QC refused permission to amend, struck out the statement of case under CPR 3.4(2)(b), and made costs orders.
3. High Court: Turner J refused permission to appeal on the papers on 12 January 2021.