AA, R (On the Application Of) v Cardiff City Council

In an age-dispute judicial review, permission should be refused only where the material shows that a court or tribunal could not properly find that the claimant is a child. Age is an objective fact, and a local authority has no margin of discretion. A full Merton-compliant assessment is required where there is genuine doubt, particularly where the apparent age falls within the borderline range and physical appearance or demeanour carries a real risk of error. It is not required where the authority relies on clear analytical reasons from the claimant’s own account, together with assessment of presentation and support needs. The margin of error and benefit of the doubt must be considered in context. An interview may satisfy procedural fairness where the claimed age and relevant answers have been properly explored.

The claimant, an Iranian national accommodated as an adult asylum-seeker, sought permission to challenge Cardiff City Council’s assessment that he was over 18. He alleged that the assessment was factually wrong, that a short-form assessment was unlawful, and that the process was procedurally unfair because the authority had not acknowledged a margin of error or applied the benefit of the doubt.

He sought transfer of the factual age dispute to the Upper Tribunal and interim support and accommodation under the Children Act 1989. The central issue was whether the material disclosed an arguable case which could properly succeed at a contested fact-finding hearing.

1. Permission refused. The grounds were not arguable and interim relief was therefore inappropriate.
2. Age is an objective fact, not a matter of reasonable belief. The local authority has no margin of discretion. Applying A v Croydon [2009] UKSC 8 and R (FZ) v Croydon London Borough Council [2011] EWCA Civ 59, permission in an age-dispute case should be refused only where the material could not properly support a finding that the claimant is a child.
3. The claimant’s account contained clear analytical inconsistencies. His evidence that he left Iran at about 17, travelled for three months and had then been in the United Kingdom for about a year was central. Taken with the assessment of his presentation and support needs, it provided a sound basis for rejecting the claimed birth date. His consistent repetition of that date did not overcome those matters.
4. A full assessment applying the guidance in R (B) v Merton London Borough Council [2003] EWHC 1689 (Admin) is reserved for cases of genuine doubt, especially where the apparent age is within the borderline range and there is real scope for error from relying on appearance and demeanour. Although the authority had not stated its assessed age, it had not acted simply on appearance or demeanour. The claimant’s account and responses strongly indicated that the claimed date was unlikely to be correct, so a full assessment was not arguably required.
5. The procedural-fairness challenge also failed. The margin of error and benefit of the doubt had to be assessed in context. The interview record showed that the claimed birth date, the journey chronology, the claimant’s willingness to accept an age of 18, and his understanding of the consequences had been probed. The court was entitled to conclude that the authority had sufficient reasons for its assessment.
6. The additional evidence concerning appearance, demeanour, punctuality and domesticity did not alter the position, since those matters carried the very risk of error identified in the authorities.

The claimant renewed an application for permission after permission had been refused on the papers by His Honour Judge Lambert on 17 December 2020. The Administrative Court refused permission at the oral renewal hearing.