Carpmaels & Ransford Llp & Anor v Regen Lab SA

An application to set aside default judgment engages the principles governing relief from sanctions, together with the requirements of CPR r.13.3. The applicant must act promptly and demonstrate either a real prospect of successfully defending the claim or another good reason for setting judgment aside. A serious procedural breach, without a good explanation, will ordinarily defeat relief where the circumstances otherwise weigh against the applicant.

Where successive solicitors’ bills culminate in termination of the retainer, they may collectively constitute a final bill, even if earlier bills were not interim statute bills. An application for assessment after judgment under section 70(3) of the Solicitors Act 1974 requires special circumstances, such as a cogent and evidenced basis for contending that the bill is excessive or unreasonable.

Carpmaels & Ransford LLP and Collyer Bristow LLP claimed unpaid fees from Regen Lab SA after their respective retainers were terminated. Regen acknowledged service but filed no defence and made no timely application challenging jurisdiction. Bryan J entered default judgment on 19 June.

Regen applied to set the judgment aside. It relied on an alleged misunderstanding that an acknowledgement of service prevented default judgment, disputed the statutory basis for the claims under the Solicitors Act 1974, and alternatively sought an assessment of the bills under section 70(3).

The central issues were whether relief from sanctions and the requirements of CPR r.13.3 were satisfied, whether the bills were barred or insufficiently informative, and whether special circumstances justified a post-judgment assessment.

1. Relief from sanctions and setting aside judgment. The failure to serve a defence, or to apply under CPR 11 to contest jurisdiction, was serious and significant. Applying Denton, there was no good explanation. The alleged misunderstanding was unsupported by direct evidence, inconsistent with the acknowledgement of service, and implausible given Regen’s litigation experience. Its wider procedural history and the absence of any evidenced substantive challenge to the fees meant that the circumstances weighed heavily against relief.
2. Under CPR r.13.3, promptness and a real prospect of successfully defending the claim, or another good reason for setting judgment aside, were required. Regen had not shown a real prospect of success. The statutory arguments were not capable of providing a viable defence.
3. Solicitors’ bills. The invoices were dated and provided payment dates. Where relevant, the accompanying schedules supplied sufficient information. More fundamentally, the bills culminated in final bills when each retainer ended. It was therefore unnecessary to decide whether the earlier invoices were contractually authorised interim statute bills. The reasoning in Iwuanyawu v Ratcliffes Solicitors [2020] EWHC B25 (Costs) supported treating a running account as one bill delivered on the date of the last bill.
4. The question whether a bill is sufficiently informative is fact-sensitive. It was unrealistic to suggest that Regen was unaware of the possibility of seeking an assessment, particularly in light of its dealings with successive English solicitors and the terms of the retainers.
5. Section 70(3) assessment. No special circumstances existed. There was no cogent evidence that the bills were wrong, excessive or unreasonable. The application to set aside judgment, including the fallback application for assessment, was dismissed.

This was a first-instance application. Default judgment had previously been entered by Bryan J on 19 June; the present court refused Regen Lab SA’s application to set it aside.