Huson v Secretary of State for the Home Department (Entry Clearance Officer) (Rev 1)

An entry clearance officer must engage with all material evidence of a claimed parent-child relationship. DNA evidence may be requested, but cannot be treated as the mandatory or exclusive means of proving paternity.

Where legitimacy depends on the Legitimacy Act 1976 presumption of reasonable belief, the decision-maker must identify evidence capable of rebutting it. A historical reference to an unavailable letter is insufficient. A court may determine a central precedent fact itself where citizenship status is in issue and the evidence permits.

The claimant challenged a 28 March 2019 refusal to certify his right of abode under section 2(1)(a) of the Immigration Act 1971. His claim depended on proving that a British citizen was his father and that, despite the parents’ polygamous marriage, he was entitled to be treated as legitimate.

The refusal relied principally on the absence of DNA evidence and stated generally that legitimacy had not been established. The claimant challenged the failure to assess extensive documentary and witness evidence, the legitimacy objection, and alleged discrimination under articles 14 and 8 of the Convention. The central issues were paternity, domicile and reasonable belief.

1. The claim succeeded. The entry clearance officer’s decision was quashed. The court declared that the claimant was entitled to certification of his right of abode and, arising from his relationship with his British father, to British nationality and a passport, subject to agreement on the wording of the order.
2. The request for DNA evidence was not unlawful. The relevant guidance did not permit DNA evidence to be mandated, but a specific request was reasonable where it could definitively establish paternity. Its absence did not permit the officer to disregard other evidence.
3. The officer’s treatment of the relationship issue was wholly inadequate. The decision failed to engage with the birth certificates, witness statements, property and education records, passport evidence and other material submitted. It therefore unlawfully failed to take relevant material into account.
4. Because paternity was a central precedent fact affecting citizenship status, the court determined it on the merits rather than remitting the issue. On the balance of probabilities, the claimant was the natural son of the putative father. Direct factual determination remained exceptional, but was appropriate given the evidence, the absence of an appeal tribunal for remittal, previous acceptance of paternity and the officer’s fixation on DNA evidence.
5. Legitimacy remained material because section 50(9) of the British Nationality Act 1981 made legitimate descent an essential component of the claimed father-child relationship. The presumption of reasonable belief under section 1 of the Legitimacy Act 1976 concerned the belief of either parent and had to be rebutted by the officer.
6. The evidence did not establish a change of the father’s domicile away from the United Kingdom. Even assuming the legitimacy issue arose, the alleged 1994 or 1995 letter no longer existed, and a 2002 reference to it provided no sufficient evidential basis for rebutting the presumption. Reliance on the absence of legitimate descent was therefore unlawful.
7. Article 14 was considered for completeness. It has no independent existence and requires facts within the ambit of another Convention right. There was insufficient evidence of the necessary family life, and the issue was academic in light of the successful grounds.