Wojciech Mariusz Stefanski v Regional Court in Kielce (Poland)

Under section 14 of the Extradition Act 2003, the question whether extradition is unjust because of delay requires an overall evaluative judgment on all the circumstances. Culpable delay may be relevant and may be decisive in a marginal case, but its relevance is not governed by a rigid binary rule. The court need not determine culpability where, on the evidence, it could not affect the overall assessment. A passage-of-time argument is distinct from the question whether a fair trial remains possible. However, speculative disadvantage, without concrete evidence that injustice is likely, will not establish the statutory bar.

The appellant faced extradition to Poland in respect of an alleged robbery in 2002. Extradition in relation to a separate child-maintenance allegation had been conceded not to concern an extradition offence. The District Judge ordered extradition and rejected the passage-of-time objection under section 14 of the Extradition Act 2003.

Lane J refused permission to appeal on the section 14 ground on the papers. The appellant renewed that application, arguing that the District Judge had wrongly treated culpability for delay as relevant only in a borderline case and had failed to address the risk of trial prejudice.

1. Permission refused. There was no realistic prospect that a substantive appeal would establish a material error of law in the District Judge’s conclusion that extradition would not be unjust through passage of time.
2. The statutory inquiry requires an overall judgment on the merits, taking all the circumstances into account. The court should avoid fine or technical distinctions and should not treat culpability as an on-off switch. Culpable delay may colour the assessment and may sometimes be decisive, particularly in a marginal case. It may also have indirect relevance where it contributes to a false sense of security.
3. Nevertheless, the District Judge was entitled not to resolve culpability because, on the facts and evidence, a finding of culpability could not have made a material difference to the evaluative exercise. Even assuming that one or both periods of delay were culpable, extradition would not thereby become unjust.
4. The section 14 inquiry is not synonymous with whether a fair trial remains possible. The court must nevertheless assess whether the alleged disadvantage is concrete and supported by cogent evidence. Here the asserted prejudice was speculative. There was no evidence of the appellant’s proposed defence, or of specific witnesses or evidence whose loss would cause injustice.
5. The circumstances differed materially from the illustrative cases involving an unavailable alibi witness or lost legal notes. The presumption that the fair-trial guarantee remained undisturbed was not displaced. The renewed application for permission to appeal was therefore refused.

1. High Court (Administrative Court): Lane J refused permission to appeal on the section 14 ground on the papers. On renewal, Fordham J refused permission to appeal.
2. Westminster Magistrates’ Court: District Judge Hamilton ordered extradition on 22 October 2020 and rejected the section 14 passage-of-time objection.