Shelley v Estate of Mr Christopher Trevor Norman

Contempt of court must be proved to the criminal standard. For disobedience of an order, the applicant must establish that the respondent knew the order’s terms, acted or failed to act in a way that breached it, and knew the facts making the conduct a breach. It is unnecessary to prove an intention to disobey. For a false statement of truth or affidavit, the applicant must prove falsity, knowledge of falsity, and knowledge that the statement was, or was likely to be, a material interference with the course of justice. A committal application may proceed before trial where the evidence substantially overlaps, provided each allegation is carefully considered. An unrepresented respondent must receive a real opportunity to obtain legal advice, but the hearing may proceed where that opportunity has been properly provided and is freely declined.

The defendant applied to commit the claimant for contempt. Fifteen allegations concerned breaches of a worldwide freezing order and proprietary injunction, failures of disclosure, a false affidavit, and false statements of truth in pleadings and replies.

The claimant admitted all allegations, remained unrepresented despite repeated advice about legal aid, and declined to give evidence. The court had to determine whether each ground was proved to the criminal standard and whether the committal application should proceed before determination of the underlying proceedings.

1. Procedural fairness. The court had to explain the availability of legal aid and provide a real, reasonable opportunity to obtain advice. The claimant had been repeatedly advised, understood the consequences of proceeding without representation, and freely chose to continue. The application could therefore proceed.
2. Standard and burden of proof. The defendant bore the burden of proving each allegation so that the court was sure. The court could draw compelling inferences from established primary facts, but an inference could not be based merely on suspicion.
3. Disobedience of orders. Following Masri v Consolidated Contractors International Company SAL [2011] EWHC 1024 (Comm) and Marketmaker Technology (Beijing) Co Ltd v Obair Group International Corporation [2009] EWHC 1445 (QB), the court required knowledge of the order, conduct amounting to breach, and knowledge of the facts constituting the breach. Applying Stancomb v Trowbridge Urban District Council [1910] 2 Ch 190 and the approach adopted in DG of Fair Trading v Pioneer Concrete [1995] 1 AC 456, an intention to breach was unnecessary.
4. False statements. Under CPR r 32.14, the court required proof that the statement was false, that the maker knew it was false, and that the maker knew it was, or was likely to be, a material interference with the course of justice. The same approach applied to the false affidavit.
5. Disposition. Grounds 1 to 14 were proved. Ground 15 was not proved because the court was not sure that an additional £40,000 had been received as fees rather than for an aborted property investment.

First-instance committal application. No appellate history was stated in the judgment.