PS v Secretary of State for the Home Department

Refugee-status cessation requires a symmetrical comparison between the circumstances supporting recognition and those at the date of the cessation decision. The Secretary of State bears the burden of proving that the relevant circumstances have ceased to exist durably, so that the original fear has been permanently eradicated and no other Convention fear arises.

The assessment must compare the individual’s former and current personal circumstances with the relevant country evidence and applicable country guidance. Extant country guidance remains authoritative unless strong, cogent evidence justifies departure. A refugee excluded from non-refoulement by Article 33(2) may nevertheless resist deportation where removal would expose them to a real risk of treatment contrary to Article 3 of the ECHR.

The appellant, a Zimbabwean national recognised as a refugee in 2008 because of her MDC activities, was convicted of manslaughter by gross negligence in 2015. The Secretary of State revoked her refugee status, made a deportation order, and rejected her protection and human-rights claims.

The First-tier Tribunal dismissed her appeal. The Upper Tribunal set that decision aside for material error of law, while preserving the finding that she was a danger to the community for the purposes of section 72 of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002. The Upper Tribunal re-made the decision on cessation and Article 3.

The central questions were whether the Secretary of State had shown that the circumstances justifying refugee status had ceased to exist, and whether deportation to Zimbabwe would breach Article 3 of the ECHR.

1. The appeal was dismissed under section 84(3)(a), but allowed on Article 3 grounds under section 84(2). The appellant remained a Convention refugee because the Secretary of State had not established cessation. Her deportation would nevertheless be permitted under Article 33(2) of the Refugee Convention, subject to the absolute prohibition in Article 3 of the ECHR.

2. Cessation is the mirror image of refugee recognition. The Secretary of State had to prove that the circumstances which justified recognition in 2008 had ceased to exist durably and that no other Convention fear now arose. This required a comparison of the appellant’s former and current personal circumstances, together with the relevant country evidence and country guidance.

3. The appellant’s political profile had diminished, but she remained a past MDC activist and a low-level MDC supporter. Applying the extant country guidance in CM (EM country guidance; disclosure) Zimbabwe CG [2013] UKUT 00059 (IAC), her home area was rural Masvingo. She remained within the risk category of a returnee without ZANU-PF connections, after a significant absence, who could not demonstrate loyalty to ZANU-PF. The respondent had not shown cogent grounds to depart from that guidance or that the risk had permanently ceased.

4. The Tribunal also found substantial grounds for believing that removal would breach Article 3. At Harare airport, the appellant’s refugee history, serious conviction, and foreseeable deterioration in her unpredictable mental illness created a real risk of interrogation and ill-treatment. Alternatively, she faced risk in Masvingo under the applicable country guidance.

5. Further alternatively, return to Harare without meaningful support would expose her to a serious, rapid and irreversible decline in mental health, causing intense suffering. Her severe bereavement disorder, moderate depressive disorder, increased suicide risk, inability to manage daily needs alone, and lack of practical support or accessible care in Zimbabwe met the Article 3 threshold.

• Upper Tribunal (Immigration and Asylum Chamber): This decision re-made the appeal after an earlier Upper Tribunal decision set aside the First-tier Tribunal’s dismissal for material error of law, while preserving the section 72 dangerousness finding.
• First-tier Tribunal: Dismissed the appellant’s protection and human-rights appeal in a decision dated 2 August 2019.