R (Sheakh) v Lambeth London Borough Council

The Court of Appeal considered whether the London Borough of Lambeth lawfully discharged the public sector equality duty in section 149 of the Equality Act 2010 when making experimental traffic orders under section 9 of the Road Traffic Regulation Act 1984 for three Low Traffic Neighbourhoods. The court held that the duty was lawfully discharged: the delegated decision-maker had regard to the equality considerations set out in the report, the experimental nature of the orders and the urgency created by the pandemic justified using a limited, staged assessment process, and the council legitimately intended to complete equality impact assessments and public consultation during the trial period.

The court applied established principles about section 149 (including the need for reasonable enquiry, context sensitivity and that the duty does not prescribe a particular procedure or outcome) and concluded that, on the facts, a rolling/ staged equality assessment integrated with post-implementation monitoring and consultation constituted "due regard". The court emphasised that this conclusion was fact‑specific and warned that a rolling assessment will not always suffice in other contexts.

Background and parties:

• The claimant, Ms Sofia Sheakh, a Lambeth resident who is severely physically disabled and dependent on a car, challenged delegated decisions of 9 October 2020 to make experimental traffic orders establishing three Low Traffic Neighbourhoods (Oval Triangle, Streatham Hill and Railton & St Matthew's) said to have worsened journey times and access for car‑dependent residents.
• The respondent was the London Borough of Lambeth Council. The decisions were taken by the council's Strategic Director: Resident Services under delegated authority.

Procedural posture:

• Kerr J. in the Administrative Court dismissed the claimant's statutory review and judicial review claims; permission to appeal was granted only on the public sector equality duty ground (section 149 EA 2010). The appeal proceeded to the Court of Appeal.

Relief sought and issues:

• Relief sought: quashing or declaration that the experimental traffic orders (ETOs) were unlawful, on grounds including failure to discharge the public sector equality duty in section 149 EA 2010.
• Primary issue framed: whether the council lawfully discharged the section 149 duty when making the ETOs on 9 October 2020, including whether the decision‑maker had "due regard" to equality considerations and whether reliance on a staged/rolling equality assessment and officers' advice was lawful.

Court's reasoning (concise):

• The court reviewed authority on section 149, emphasising that the duty is context sensitive, does not prescribe a fixed procedure or outcome and implies a duty of reasonable enquiry (Tameside principle).
• The court identified six contextual factors supporting the council's approach: the decisions were to make genuine experimental orders of limited statutory duration; urgent government guidance during the pandemic required speedy action; the statutory ETO procedure has limited pre‑making requirements; inherent uncertainty about traffic displacement meant trialling was appropriate; the council committed to six months' post‑implementation consultation and monitoring; and the report expressly addressed section 149 and anticipated further equality impact assessment.
• Given those factors, the court concluded the decision‑maker had "due regard" at the time he made the ETOs: he was told enough by officers, consciously directed his mind to equality matters, and reasonably intended further assessment during the experiment. The court stressed the conclusion was fact‑specific and does not endorse rolling assessment in every case.

Subsidiary points:

• The court rejected the claimant's contention of unlawful delegation and accepted that reasonable reliance on officers' advice was lawful where the decision‑maker was informed of relevant matters.
• The court did not decide whether paragraph 37 of Schedule 9 (which limits legal challenges to ETOs) precludes declarations issued after the six‑week challenge period; it left that question moot given the substantive dismissal of the appeal.

The appeal was dismissed. The Court of Appeal held that the council lawfully discharged its public sector equality duty under section 149 of the Equality Act 2010 when making the experimental traffic orders: the delegated decision-maker had regard to equality considerations in the report, the experimental and urgent context justified a staged or "rolling" equality assessment integrated with monitoring and consultation, and reliance on officers' advice was lawful because the decision-maker was told enough of the relevant facts. The court emphasised the conclusion was confined to the specific factual and legal context and warned that rolling assessment will not always suffice.

Appeal from the Administrative Court (Planning Court), Queen's Bench Division: Kerr J. [2021] EWHC 1745 (Admin) (claim dismissed). Permission to appeal granted only on the section 149 Equality Act 2010 ground; a separate permission on a section 122 Road Traffic Regulation Act 1984 ground was refused by Dingemans LJ. The present judgment is the Court of Appeal decision [2022] EWCA Civ 457.