Sofia Sheakh (R on the application of) v London Borough of Lambeth Council

The intensity of the public sector equality duty is sensitive to the function, facts and stage of decision-making. An early, genuinely experimental decision may lawfully proceed on a provisional equality assessment where its purpose includes obtaining better evidence, all options remain open, and monitoring and consultation will inform later decisions.

The decision-maker must personally have due regard to the statutory equality needs, but may rely on officers’ advice if told enough to ensure that no legally necessary matter is omitted. Neither an equality impact assessment nor exhaustive knowledge of every conceivable impact is invariably required. A rolling assessment is not automatically lawful, and urgency alone cannot excuse non-compliance.

Lambeth Council made experimental traffic orders under section 9 of the Road Traffic Regulation Act 1984 for three Low Traffic Neighbourhoods. The orders restricted vehicular movement to promote walking and cycling. They were introduced during the Covid-19 pandemic following urgent statutory guidance.

The appellant, a severely disabled resident dependent on her car, alleged that displaced traffic increased congestion and journey times. She contended that the council had failed to discharge the public sector equality duty before making the orders.

Kerr J dismissed her claims for statutory and judicial review in [2021] EWHC 1745 (Admin). The sole issue on appeal was whether the council had lawfully had due regard to the equality needs in section 149 of the Equality Act 2010 when it made the experimental orders.

1. Appeal dismissed. The council lawfully discharged the public sector equality duty when it made the experimental traffic orders.

2. The intensity of the regard required by section 149 of the Equality Act 2010 depends on the facts and context. Relevant matters include the decision’s subject matter, timing, place in a sequence, duration and potential consequences. An early experimental decision which does not finally determine equality impacts may require less assessment than a final or permanent decision, particularly where the experiment will produce evidence for a later assessment.

3. The orders were genuine, time-limited experiments made in response to urgent government guidance during the pandemic. The council intended to gather information, undertake consultation and decide later whether the schemes should be withdrawn, modified or made permanent. The report recognised the protected characteristics, accurately stated the statutory duty and recorded a provisional assessment that disproportionate effects were not expected. Those circumstances made the regard given at that stage sufficient.

4. A rolling equality assessment is not automatically appropriate merely because a function initiates an experiment. Its lawfulness always depends on the particular facts and legal context. Nor does urgency, including pandemic urgency, excuse a failure to discharge the duty.

5. The absence of completed equality impact assessments did not establish non-compliance. Section 149 prescribes neither that document nor any particular procedure. It was lawful to use monitoring and consultation to investigate impacts, including increased journey times for disabled people reliant on cars, which could not yet be predicted confidently.

6. The decision-maker personally considered the statutory equality needs. He could rely on the project team’s provisional assessment and was not required to reproduce its work or go behind its advice. He was told enough to ensure that no legally relevant matter which he needed to know was omitted. The council also fulfilled the associated duty of reasonable inquiry.

7. The possible effect of paragraph 37 of Schedule 9 to the Road Traffic Regulation Act 1984 on a late judicial review claim seeking only declaratory relief was academic. The court left that question open.

1. Court of Appeal (Civil Division): The appeal was dismissed. The court upheld the conclusion that the council had lawfully discharged the public sector equality duty.

2. High Court, Administrative Court (Planning Court): Kerr J dismissed the claims for statutory review and judicial review in [2021] EWHC 1745 (Admin). He granted permission to appeal only on the public sector equality duty ground.