Gabriele Volpi & Anor. v Matteo Volpi

The Court of Appeal restates that an appellate court will not overturn a trial judge's findings of primary fact unless the decision is one that no reasonable judge could have reached; on appeals about documents and signatures the judge may prefer witness or circumstantial evidence over inconclusive expert opinion. In disputes between parent and adult child the presumption of advancement is weak and rebuttable; the donor's subjective intention governs whether a transfer is a gift.

The respondents sought repayment of sums said to be loans advanced for the purchase and completion of an apartment in Lugano. The defendant appealed the High Court's finding that the payments (CHF 4 million and a further CHF 2 million) were interest-free loans rather than gifts. The appeal centreed on factual findings: authenticity of disputed signatures on loan documentation and powers of attorney, the probative force of expert handwriting evidence, contemporaneous documents and the parties' intentions. The Court of Appeal heard argument on the standard of review and the relevance of the presumption of advancement and dismissed the appeal, upholding the trial judge's assessment of the evidence.

1. Disposition: The appeal is dismissed. The Court of Appeal concluded that HHJ Jarman QC’s finding that the payments were interest-free loans rather than gifts was rationally supportable and not plainly wrong.
2. Standard of appellate review of primary facts: The court reiterated established principles: an appellate court should only interfere if a trial judge’s findings are plainly wrong; it must assume the judge considered the whole evidence unless there is compelling reason to the contrary; and the appeal court must not retry factual issues absent irrationality ([2022] EWCA Civ 464 paras 1–6).
3. Evaluation of expert and documentary evidence: The court accepted that expert handwriting opinions based on copies and stylistic comparison are inferential and may be inconclusive. A judge may accept or prefer one strand of evidence over expert opinion if there is a rational basis to do so. Where a document comes from reputable custody, and a signature is alleged to be forged, the burden of proof lies on the party asserting forgery; a notarial act or instrument may be received as duly authenticated unless the contrary is proved (CPR Part 32.20) (paras 28–36, 54–56).
4. Presumption of advancement and donor’s intention: The court explained that the presumption of advancement (as between parent and child) is weak as between a father and an adult child and is a factual, rebuttable presumption. The decisive inquiry is the putative donor’s subjective intention; the presumption will rarely be decisive where evidence exists (paras 44–47).
5. Application to this case:
   • The judge’s fact-finding was supported by contemporaneous documents (draft and executed loan agreements, emails, bearer mortgage arrangements), witness evidence, inherent probabilities and the absence of corroborating documents for the gift hypothesis; these factors justified his conclusion that the payments were loans (paras 48–53, 64).
   • The judge was entitled to find that the signature on the final page of the loan agreement was more likely genuine on the balance of probabilities and to treat the overall loan documentation as corroborative of an intention not to make a gift (paras 55–57).
   • The judge’s inability to reach a concluded view as to the genuineness of the power of attorney signature did not render his overall conclusion irrational; the evidence supporting the loan hypothesis remained persuasive (paras 58–64).
6. Practical guidance: When assessing contested documentary proof and handwriting evidence, appellate courts should respect the advantage of a trial judge who has heard live witnesses and seen the whole evidential tapestry; islands of selected evidence do not justify overturning rational findings (paras 65–66).
7. Orders: Appeal dismissed. Costs not separately stated in the judgment.

• High Court (Business and Property Courts): Trial before His Honour Judge Jarman QC (BL-2019-001956) — judgment found funds to be interest-free loans rather than gifts (referred to in this appeal).
• Court of Appeal (Civil Division): Appeal heard and dismissed; HHJ Jarman QC’s factual findings upheld by a majority (Lewison LJ, Males LJ, Snowden LJ).