City of York Council, R (on the application of) v AUH & Ors.

A specific statutory power given to a local weights and measures authority to bring proceedings for consumer offences committed outside its area is free-standing. It is not subject to the general local-expediency condition in section 222(1) of the Local Government Act 1972. The words “may bring proceedings” are sufficient to authorise prosecution. The distinction between offences committed inside and outside an authority’s area creates no illogical result: an in-area prosecution would ordinarily satisfy the local-expediency requirement if prosecution were proportionate. Paragraph 46(1) of Schedule 5 to the Consumer Rights Act 2015 therefore permits cross-boundary prosecution without recourse to section 222(1).

Two local authorities appealed against conflicting preparatory-hearing rulings concerning their power to prosecute alleged consumer offences outside their areas. In the York case, the Crown Court at Bradford stayed proceedings as an abuse of process, holding that the authority’s power remained governed by section 222(1) of the Local Government Act 1972 and that the local-expediency test was not met. In the Birmingham case, the Crown Court at Snaresbrook dismissed a stay application, holding that paragraph 46(1) of Schedule 5 to the Consumer Rights Act 2015 supplied the power despite the unmet test.

The common issue was whether paragraph 46(1) conferred a free-standing power to prosecute consumer offences committed outside the prosecuting authority’s area.

The appeals raised the same principal issue. The court held that paragraph 46(1) of Schedule 5 to the Consumer Rights Act 2015 confers a free-standing power on a local weights and measures authority to bring proceedings for a consumer offence allegedly committed outside its area. The power is not constrained by section 222(1) of the Local Government Act 1972.

1. The starting point was the clear statutory language. Paragraph 46(1) expressly addresses proceedings for consumer offences committed outside the authority’s area. Section 222(1) is a general power concerning local-authority legal proceedings and cannot qualify later legislation conferring a specific power.

2. The pre-legislative history reinforced that construction. It showed concern about cross-boundary consumer offending and an intention to remove restrictions requiring local expediency before proceedings could be taken. Centralised investigation and funding arrangements formed part of that context.

3. The court approved the reasoning in Lamont-Perkins v Royal Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals [2012] EWHC 1002 (Admin), concerning section 30 of the Animal Welfare Act 2006. That specific prosecutorial power was included to avoid argument that section 222 governed prosecutions under the Act. The same reasoning applied to paragraph 46.

4. The wording “may bring proceedings”, rather than “prosecute”, made no difference. In this context the expressions have the same meaning. Nor was it illogical that paragraph 46(1) applies only to out-of-area offences: an in-area prosecution would almost inevitably satisfy section 222(1) if prosecution were proportionate.

The court resolved the principal issue in favour of the local authorities. Further matters remained to be identified and determined, with directions to follow.

• Crown Court at Bradford: His Honour Judge Burn stayed the York proceedings as an abuse of process, holding that section 222(1) of the Local Government Act 1972 governed the power to prosecute and that the local-expediency test was not met.
• Crown Court at Snaresbrook: His Honour Judge Southern dismissed the application to stay the Birmingham proceedings, holding that paragraph 46(1) of Schedule 5 to the Consumer Rights Act 2015 supplied power to prosecute despite the unmet section 222(1) test.
• Court of Appeal (Criminal Division): The court held that paragraph 46(1) conferred a free-standing power to prosecute out-of-area consumer offences. Further matters were left for directions and determination.