Regina v Lonel-Octavian Stanciu

Where an offender uses petrol or another accelerant to set fire to a victim’s home while the victim is inside, intending death or really serious injury, the murder will usually be of particularly high seriousness. A 30-year minimum-term starting point is normally appropriate, save perhaps in exceptional circumstances.

The starting point already reflects inherent features of that offending, including occupancy, acquisition and use of an accelerant, planning, vulnerability to being trapped, and the usual risk to firefighters. Those features must not be counted again unless their case-specific extent goes beyond what is inherent. Serious injury to another victim may justify an upward movement before mitigation is considered.

The appellant was convicted at the Central Criminal Court of murder and causing grievous bodily harm with intent under section 18 of the Offences Against the Person Act 1861. He had set fire with petrol to a makeshift hut in which two men were present. One died and the other sustained life-changing burn injuries.

He received life imprisonment for murder with a minimum term of 31 years, less time on remand. He appealed on the grounds that the judge was not entitled to find premeditated intent to burn the occupants, had double-counted aggravating features, and had imposed a manifestly excessive minimum term. The central issue was the proper minimum-term approach to murder caused by setting fire to an occupied home.

1. Appeal dismissed. The sentencing judge was entitled to accept the material part of the surviving victim’s evidence and to find, to the criminal standard, that the appellant had formed the intention to burn the occupants before reaching the hut. Those findings were consistent with the jury’s verdicts and other evidence.

2. Under sections 321 and 322 and Schedule 21 to the Sentencing Act 2020, a 30-year starting point was properly selected. The court followed R v Jones & Ors [2005] EWCA Crim 3115. Murder by using petrol or another accelerant to set fire to an occupied victim’s home, with the necessary intent, is usually particularly serious. The distinction between intending death and intending really serious injury will ordinarily carry little weight in that context.

3. The court stressed that inherent features of this category of offending must not be double-counted. Knowledge or belief that the premises are occupied, the acquisition and use of an accelerant, and the resulting planning are ordinarily reflected in the 30-year starting point. So too are the victim’s ordinary vulnerability to being trapped and the usual risk to firefighters. An upward adjustment remains possible where the facts show a degree of planning, vulnerability or risk beyond that inherent in the offence.

4. Serious offences against additional victims are separately material. The grievous bodily harm with intent inflicted on the second victim properly justified an upward movement from 30 years before personal mitigation was assessed. The judge had given only limited weight to the overlapping aggravating features and was best placed to assess mitigation. The 31-year minimum term was not manifestly excessive.

• Court of Appeal (Criminal Division): Dismissed the appeal against the 31-year minimum term for murder.

• Central Criminal Court: On 22 March 2021, following trial before HHJ Leonard QC and a jury, convicted the appellant of murder and causing grievous bodily harm with intent. Imposed life imprisonment for murder with a minimum term of 31 years, less 748 days on remand; no separate penalty was imposed for the section 18 offence.