REGINA v DANIEL DONALD MIDDLETON

Credit for a guilty plea depends on the first reasonable opportunity to plead guilty. Exceptional circumstances may justify a later plea attracting greater credit, but a defendant who maintains a false denial while represented and advised about credit cannot ordinarily claim full credit merely because a more serious indictment is later served. Delay before sentencing does not automatically require a specific reduction, particularly where it is explained by court pressures, the pandemic or defence requests, and its effects have been taken into account. Intervention on appeal requires a sentence that is wrong in principle or manifestly excessive.

The appellant pleaded guilty at the Crown Court to conspiracy to supply cocaine. He was sentenced to seven years’ imprisonment, representing a provisional sentence of nine years and four months after a 25% reduction for his plea. He appealed against sentence, arguing that the starting point was excessive, that insufficient weight had been given to his mitigation and the delay before sentence, and that he should have received one-third credit for his plea.

The appeal concerned the proper credit for a guilty plea, the relevance of mental disorder and personal circumstances, the effect of time spent in custody serving a recalled sentence, and whether the sentence was manifestly excessive.

1. Appeal dismissed. The starting point of nine years was accepted as appropriate. The resulting provisional sentence of nine years and four months was not manifestly excessive.
2. The appellant was not entitled to one-third credit. Although R v Marland [2021] EWCA Crim 706; [2022] 1 Cr App R(S) 12 recognised exceptional circumstances explaining a failure to plead guilty at the first hearing, no comparable circumstances existed here. The appellant had instructed that he was not guilty, had given a false account, was legally represented, and had been advised about credit for a plea. He knew he was guilty and could and should have pleaded guilty.
3. A guilty plea entered after service of the indictment did not amount to a plea at the earlier reasonable opportunity where the appellant had previously denied involvement. The plea was also accompanied by an unrealistic and dishonest basis of plea which was later abandoned. The 25% credit was therefore correct.
4. The appellant’s release on licence only two months before the offending was a very significant aggravating factor. His general record of serious offending, including three sentences of five years or more, was a further significant aggravating factor. The earlier drugs conviction carried little weight.
5. The appellant’s mental-health difficulties did not significantly reduce mitigation. The relevant focus was their effect on culpability, and it had been accepted that they did not reduce culpability. They made custody harder, but the nature and extent of the conspiracy showed that he knew what he was doing and the consequences of being caught.
6. There was no obligation to reduce an otherwise appropriate sentence solely because 14 months spent serving the recalled sentence did not count towards the sentence for the new offence. The delay was explained by the pandemic, the need to clarify the basis of plea, and a defence request for further psychiatric investigation. The judge had taken the pandemic and the difficulty of custody into account.
7. The sentence was neither manifestly excessive nor wrong in principle.

• Crown Court at Isleworth: on 2 February 2022, Ms Recorder Maya Sikand QC sentenced the appellant to seven years’ imprisonment for conspiracy to supply cocaine.
• Court of Appeal (Criminal Division): the appeal against sentence was dismissed on 26 July 2022. The sentence was held neither manifestly excessive nor wrong in principle.