R v Charles Byrne

In sentencing manslaughter by reason of diminished responsibility, the central question is the offender’s retained responsibility. The court must consider the medical evidence together with all relevant information. A finding that offending was highly and directly attributable to mental illness must be assessed in the context of the offender’s whole conduct, including closely connected offences.

Where the statutory dangerousness criteria justify life imprisonment, a court must consider the need for a penal element and whether a hospital and limitation direction under the Mental Health Act 1983 is appropriate. A unanimous psychiatric preference for a hospital and restriction order does not compel that disposal.

The appellant pleaded guilty to manslaughter by reason of diminished responsibility after killing his former partner, Christina Rowe. He also pleaded guilty to the attempted murder of her daughter, T, after she witnessed the killing.

It was common ground that the appellant had paranoid schizophrenia at the time. The medical evidence supported a substantial impairment of his responsibility, but did not establish insanity. Pepperall J sentenced him to life imprisonment, with a 16-year minimum term, and made a hospital and limitation direction under section 45A of the Mental Health Act 1983.

The appeal challenged the assessment of retained responsibility, the need for a penal element and life sentence, the choice of a hybrid order rather than a hospital and restriction order, and the length of the minimum term.

1. Appeal dismissed. The sentence was neither wrong in principle nor manifestly excessive. It fairly and proportionately met the objectives of punishment, rehabilitation and public protection.
2. A conviction for manslaughter by reason of diminished responsibility necessarily establishes substantial impairment of one or more relevant mental abilities. It does not equate to insanity or extinguish culpability. The decisive sentencing issue was the appellant’s retained responsibility. The sentencing judge had to assess that issue by reference to the medical evidence and all relevant information.
3. Pepperall J was entitled to find that the appellant retained responsibility at the high end of the medium range. The finding that the offending was highly and directly attributable to mental illness could not be considered in isolation. The attempted murder of T shortly after the killing, including the accepted intention to kill her because she had seen her mother’s body, was highly material to the assessment of responsibility for the killing.
4. The court found no error in the sentencing assessment. The applicable guideline reflected the principles in R v Vowles [2015] EWCA Crim 45 and R v Edwards [2018] EWCA Crim 595. The appellant’s illness did not provide a sound reason to exclude a penal element. The nominal sentences, including the assessment of harm caused by the attempted murder, disclosed no excessive punishment.
5. There was ample evidence of a continuing significant risk of serious harm. Life imprisonment was therefore appropriate under section 285 of the Sentencing Act 2020. Although all psychiatrists favoured a hospital and restriction order under sections 37 and 41 of the Mental Health Act 1983, that preference did not require the judge to adopt it. The judge was entitled to conclude that custody with a hospital and limitation direction under section 45A was appropriate.

• Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) — dismissed the appeal against sentence.
• Crown Court at Worcester — Pepperall J sentenced the appellant on 25 March 2022 to life imprisonment with a 16-year minimum term, a hospital and limitation direction under section 45A of the Mental Health Act 1983, and a concurrent sentence for attempted murder.