R v Alex Melaku

When sentencing young offenders involved in the same serious offence, relative youth is a prime mitigating factor. Where ages fall on different sides of statutory thresholds, the resulting disparity should fairly reflect differences in age and maturity. Under the Sentencing Act 2020, the applicable starting point for an offender under 18 must be adjusted where the offending includes a feature not reflected in that starting point, such as taking a knife to the scene. Immaturity must be assessed alongside culpability and the seriousness of the offending. An appellate challenge will not be arguable where the sentencing judge considered the proper factors, including the pre-sentence report, and reached a sentence properly reflecting both criminality and personal circumstances.

The applicant was aged 17 when he participated with three co-accused in a planned gang-related murder and conspiracy to cause grievous bodily harm. He was convicted at the Central Criminal Court and, when sentenced at age 18, received detention at Her Majesty’s Pleasure with a minimum term of 21 years, less time spent on remand.

After refusal by a single judge, he sought an extension of time and renewal of his application for leave to appeal against sentence. He argued that his age and immaturity, particularly the matters identified in the pre-sentence report, had not been adequately reflected in the minimum term.

The court extended time by 20 days to validate the renewed application, but refused the application for leave to appeal because the grounds were not arguable.

1. Statutory starting points. For the adult co-accused, paragraph 4 of Schedule 21 to the Sentencing Act 2020 provided a 25-year starting point for murder committed by an offender over 18 with a weapon or knife brought to the scene. For the applicant, who was under 18 when the murder was committed, paragraph 6 provided a 12-year starting point. Taking a knife to the scene was not reflected in that starting point and therefore warranted a significant upward adjustment.
2. Age and maturity. Relative youth was a prime mitigating factor for each offender. Where offenders’ ages fell on different sides of statutory age thresholds, the judge was entitled to move from the respective starting points so that the disparity fairly reflected differences in age and maturity. The court referred to Attorney-General Reference Nos 143 and 144 of 2006 [2007] EWCA Crim 1245 at paragraph 27.
3. Weight given to immaturity. The pre-sentence report provided important insight into the applicant’s background and immaturity, and the sentencing judge expressly considered it. Nevertheless, there was a limit to the weight that immaturity could bear in offending involving cold and calculated planning, an intended attack on a random victim, dangerous weapons, brutality and subsequent concealment. The applicant’s full participation was relevant to the assessment.
4. Appellate conclusion. The sentencing judge had presided over the trial and was particularly well placed to assess the applicant’s involvement, maturity, character and attitude. The sentence properly reflected both the criminality and the applicant’s personal circumstances, including age and maturity. There was no proper basis for criticism of the sentencing approach.

• Court of Appeal (Criminal Division): extended time to validate the renewed application, but refused leave to appeal against sentence.
• Central Criminal Court: convicted the applicant on 11 August 2021 and sentenced him on 17 September 2021 to five years’ detention for conspiracy to cause grievous bodily harm and detention at Her Majesty’s Pleasure for murder, with a minimum term of 21 years less 501 days on remand.