NURSING AND MIDWIFERY COUNCIL & Anor. v ALVIDA HARROLD

A general civil restraint order may be extended where the court considers continuation appropriate, but each extension must not exceed two years. The court should consider evidence relating to the period since the order was made or last extended, so that the duration safeguard is respected.

Future vexatious conduct may be assessed by reference to past conduct, including repeated attempts to reopen concluded proceedings and abusive allegations against opponents or their representatives. A restraint order is a permission filter, not an absolute bar. It should not prevent a claim with arguable merit from being brought.

The Applicants sought a further two-year extension of a general civil restraint order made against the Respondent. The order restricted claims and applications in specified courts and tribunals without permission.

The Respondent had repeatedly attempted to relitigate matters concerning her dismissal, professional striking-off and earlier proceedings. She also made repeated allegations of dishonesty and misconduct against the Applicants’ legal representatives and pursued related regulatory complaints.

The court considered whether continuation of the order was appropriate under the relevant procedural guidance and inherent jurisdiction, and whether restrictions should continue to cover proceedings in the Employment Tribunal and Employment Appeal Tribunal.

1. Extension of the order. The application was granted. Applying CPR 3C PD §4.10, the court held that it was appropriate to extend the general civil restraint order for the maximum period of two years. The order was also continued under the court’s inherent jurisdiction in relation to proceedings in the Employment Tribunal and Employment Appeal Tribunal.
2. Applicable approach. The court applied the guidance in Chief Constable of Avon and Somerset Constabulary v Gray [2016] EWHC 2998 (QB), supplemented by Sheikh v Page [2017] EWHC 1772 (QB). Evidence should ordinarily address matters relevant to the period since the order was made or most recently extended. Otherwise, the two-year limit could be circumvented.
3. Assessment of future vexation. The immediate focus is the likelihood of vexatious conduct in the future, assessed principally by conduct since the existing order. Earlier conduct remains relevant because it provides context and may indicate how the respondent is likely to behave. Repeated attempts to reopen concluded decisions, refusal to accept final judgments and baseless allegations against opponents were strong evidence of continuing risk.
4. Scope of a GCRO. A general civil restraint order is a permission filter rather than an absolute prohibition on proceedings. It does not protect a party from a proper claim. The court would not refuse permission for a claim of substance with arguable merit. In this case, however, the evidence showed a continuing intention to relitigate decided matters and to use complaints against legal representatives as a proxy means of doing so.
5. Duration and practical order. The length of the Respondent’s litigation, the number of courts and tribunals involved, and her continuing desire to pursue matters already decided justified the full two-year extension. The order included provision for an application to vary or set it aside because the Respondent had not attended the hearing.

The judgment describes earlier orders in the same litigation: a general civil restraint order was made by Laing J, extended by Foskett J, Warby J and Chamberlain J, and an appeal against Chamberlain J’s order was refused permission by Lewison LJ.