SOCIAL WORK ENGLAND v JOSEPH ESSIFUL

An interim suspension order may be extended only where the extension, its duration and the order being continued are necessary for public protection or in the public interest. Relevant considerations include the gravity of the allegations, the seriousness of the risk of harm, the reasons for delay and the practitioner’s prejudice. A substantial extension may be justified where proceedings have progressed properly, delays have arisen for good reasons, further delay is foreseeable, and regular review and liberty to apply protections remain available.

Social Work England applied under Schedule 2 §14 of the Social Workers Regulations 2018 to extend for twelve months an interim suspension order imposed on the defendant and previously extended by this Court. The defendant, who was homeless and unrepresented, had been notified but did not participate in the hearing. The application arose while substantive regulatory proceedings remained unresolved because medical assessment and final hearings had been postponed for health-related reasons and homelessness. The central issue was whether a further twelve-month extension was necessary for public protection or in the public interest.

1. Application granted. The court extended the interim suspension order for twelve months, to 21 May 2023, subject to the regulatory review mechanism and a liberty to apply provision protecting the defendant.
2. The governing test was necessity for the protection of the public or in the public interest. That necessity applied to the extension, to the nature of the interim order and to its duration. Applying GMC v Hiew [2007] EWCA Civ 369, relevant matters included the gravity of the allegations, the seriousness of the risk of harm, the reasons why the case had not concluded and the prejudice to the practitioner.
3. The allegations concerned dishonesty offences resulting in a conviction and a thirty-month custodial sentence. They indicated a potential risk to the public, called into question the defendant’s ability to practise safely and with integrity, and were accompanied by limited evidence of insight.
4. The proceedings had been pursued and progressed properly. Adjournments and postponements had occurred for good reasons connected with the defendant’s health and circumstances, including homelessness, and steps were being taken to obtain an independent medical assessment and secure a substantive outcome.
5. A twelve-month period provided necessary headroom in circumstances where further delay was foreseeable. The order would fall away if the proceedings were resolved, would be reviewed every three months, and the defendant retained liberty to apply. Those safeguards did not displace the substantial public-protection justification for continuation.
6. The court fully considered the prejudice caused by preventing the defendant from working as a social worker, including its possible contribution to his circumstances, but concluded that imperative public-protection and public-interest reasons made the extension necessary.