HOWARD FIELD v GIOVANNI DEL VECCHIO

Personal service of contempt proceedings is effective where the document is brought to the respondent’s attention as a legal document and is left with or near him, even if he immediately refuses it or the process server later retrieves it.

Where personal service is not established, the court may dispense with it where justice requires, including where the respondent knows the substance of the proceedings or has evaded service.

Contempt requires proof that the respondent knew the order, breached it, and knew the facts constituting the breach. Knowledge that the conduct was legally contemptuous is unnecessary. Sentencing may be deferred where the respondent is absent, to preserve fair-trial rights and a realistic opportunity for participation.

The claimant, administrator of the estate of Douglas Fields, sought committal of the defendant for contempt. The defendant had failed to comply with two orders requiring him to permit access to a flat and deliver up artwork belonging to the estate.

The court determined whether the contempt application had been personally served, whether the alleged breaches were proved to the criminal standard, and what mental element was required for contempt. Having found the contempt proved, the court considered whether to sentence in the defendant’s absence, given that his whereabouts were unknown.

1. Service. The contempt application was personally served. The process server told the defendant that the papers were legal documents connected with proceedings in which he was involved. The envelope touched him, was left on the ground near him when he refused to take it, and he thereby had sufficient control to exercise dominion over it, however briefly. Later retrieval did not invalidate service.
2. The relevant focus is the recipient’s knowledge, not the precise process by which it is acquired. Where documents are refused, service may be effected by telling the person what they contain and leaving them with or near him.
3. Dispensing with service. It was unnecessary to decide the issue because personal service had been proved. The proper approach is to ask what justice requires in the particular circumstances, rather than treat evasion as the only possible ground. On the facts, the defendant’s knowledge of the application and his evasion would have justified treating the attempted service as sufficient.
4. Contempt. The claimant proved to the criminal standard that the defendant knew of both orders, failed to permit access and deliver up the artwork, and knew the facts constituting those breaches. It was unnecessary to prove that he knew, as a matter of law, that his conduct amounted to contempt.
5. The contempt was therefore established in respect of both orders.
6. Sentence. The court deferred sentencing and issued a bench warrant. Sentencing in the defendant’s absence would further interfere with his fair-trial rights under Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights. A six-week adjournment was ordered, with liberty to apply, so that the defendant could participate in a sentencing hearing if present in the jurisdiction.