RONALD JOHN BULLOCK & Anor v DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS

Prosecutorial decisions are subject to a wide margin of discretion and will rarely be quashed. Intervention is justified only where there is an obvious mistake, such as an error of law or reasoning that shows a lack of care and thoroughness.

In a prosecution for making a false allegation of rape, the evidential question differs from whether the original allegation failed the ordinary prosecutorial test. If the evidence means that the allegation might reasonably be true, there is no realistic prospect of conviction for perverting the course of justice. Prosecutors must assess the evidence as a whole, including explanations for apparently incriminating messages, inconsistencies, myths and stereotypes, and the possible effect of appropriate jury directions.

The claimants, the parents of RB, sought judicial review of the DPP’s decision not to prosecute DE for perverting the course of justice or another offence arising from her allegation that RB had raped her. The police had initially taken no further action against RB. Following a later investigation, a specialist prosecutor concluded that the evidential stage of the Code for Crown Prosecutors was not met because the evidence did not establish that DE’s allegation was false and might reasonably be true.

The claimants challenged the decision on grounds including factual error, misapplication of prosecutorial guidance, Convention breaches, non-disclosure and irrationality. The central issue was whether the prosecutor’s assessment of the text messages, inconsistencies and explanations was legally flawed or outside the margin of prosecutorial discretion.

1. Application dismissed. The DPP’s decision not to prosecute was not shown to be unlawful or so unreasonable as to fall outside the wide margin of prosecutorial discretion.
2. The court accepted that the guidance concerning false allegations refined the general balance-of-probabilities assessment in the evidential stage of the Code for Crown Prosecutors. Where the evidence means that the original allegation might reasonably be true, a properly directed jury must acquit, so there is no realistic prospect of conviction for the false-allegation offence.
3. The prosecutor had to assess whether the allegation was false, not merely whether the evidence was sufficient to prosecute the original rape allegation. The post-incident messages appeared strongly capable of supporting consent, but the prosecutor was entitled to consider DE’s explanation that she had maintained a normal appearance to avoid suspicion. The messages were not unequivocal admissions of consensual sex.
4. The inconsistencies between the account put to RB in 2015 and DE’s later interview required consideration in context. The decision’s reasoning was brief, but the representations before the prosecutor identified the alleged inconsistencies and implausibilities. The absence of a formal statement or ABE interview in 2015 also affected their evidential value.
5. The court considered that a prosecutor should take account of the possible effect of a direction addressing myths and stereotypes concerning sexual complaints. The GP evidence concerning the timing of DE’s period could not have altered the overall assessment.
6. The decision could be understood as founded on the evidence and did not demonstrate the lack of care, thoroughness or detail found in Torpey. The court therefore declined to interfere. The Convention grounds stood or fell with compliance with the Code, and no separate breach was established.

• High Court (Administrative Court): permission to bring judicial review proceedings was granted by Supperstone J on 10 February 2020. A later interlocutory decision, [2020] EWHC 2259 (Admin), refused further disclosure. The present court dismissed the claim challenging the DPP’s decision dated 12 September 2019.