Case details
Summary
For the statutory gateway allowing extrinsic evidence in will construction, ambiguity requires the words used to be capable of bearing two or more meanings. A mistaken understanding of inheritance-tax consequences does not itself create ambiguity. Nor can the order or fiscal effect of otherwise clear gifts replace a definition contained in the will. Evidence of subjective intention is therefore unavailable unless the statutory gateway is first established. An earlier decision concerning a different will and clause does not establish ambiguity in the present instrument.
Factual background
The appeal concerned the construction of a will made by Audrey Thelma Anita Arkell. Clause 4 gave the nil-rate sum to John Wayland Beasant and defined that sum by reference to the largest cash sum that could pass without inheritance tax becoming due. Other gifts to Mr Beasant exceeded the nil-rate band.
The Chief Master refused to admit the will-drafter’s evidence under section 21 of the Administration of Justice Act 1982 and construed clause 4 as conferring no valuable benefit in the circumstances. The appeal challenged both conclusions. The central issue was whether the will was ambiguous on its face or in the light of surrounding circumstances.
Held
The appeal was dismissed. The Chief Master had correctly refused to admit the evidence of the will-drafter and had correctly construed clause 4.
- Facial ambiguity. Section 21(1)(b) requires identification of wording in the will capable of bearing more than one meaning. That concept may include internal inconsistency of the kind considered in Re Huntley, but the court must still identify the ambiguous words. Clause 4.1 clearly defined the nil-rate sum by reference to a computation arising from the deemed transfer of value immediately before death. It could not be read as merely identifying the occasion of charge or as a gift of the nil-rate band free of tax.
- The position and effect of later gifts did not create a second meaning. Gifts should ordinarily be given equal effect unless the will indicates otherwise. The appellant’s proposed construction required replacement of the definition, rather than interpretation of ambiguous language.
- Surrounding circumstances. The evidence suggested that the draftsman or testatrix may have misunderstood the inheritance-tax consequences. That might support a rectification claim, but it did not create ambiguity in clause 4. Section 21(1)(c) was therefore unavailable.
- RSPCA v Sharpe. That case concerned a different will and clause. The relevant first-instance reasoning had been overturned, and the Court of Appeal decision did not assist the appellant. The appeal against the costs order required no separate consideration.
The court’s approach to earlier authorities
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Appellate history
- High Court (Chancery Division): appeal from the Chief Master’s decisions dated 5 February, 17 August and 9 November 2021. The appeal was dismissed.
- Chief Master Shuman: refused admission of extrinsic evidence under section 21 of the Administration of Justice Act 1982 and construed the will in favour of the residuary beneficiary: [2021] EWHC 3910 and [2021] EWHC 2315 (Ch).
Lower court decision
Key cases cited
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Cases citing this case
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