CLAIRE LORRAINE WILLIAMS v CATHERINE HILARY WILLIAMS

Testamentary capacity is determined on the balance of probabilities by evaluating the evidence as a whole in relation to the particular will and its circumstances. The solicitor’s assessment is important but not decisive. Medical evidence, compliance with the golden rule and the rationality of the will are likewise relevant but not conclusive.

Undue influence affecting a will is a distinct probate doctrine. There is no presumption of undue influence. The challenger must prove facts inconsistent with any conclusion other than that the will resulted from coercion or fraud. Vulnerability, dependence, persuasion and family influence do not suffice unless the testator’s volition was overborne or the testator’s mind was poisoned by fraudulent calumny.

The deceased’s daughter Claire challenged the validity of the deceased’s 2019 Will, which appointed Catherine as executrix, gave Catherine the deceased’s personal chattels and divided the residue equally between the daughters. Claire sought probate of an earlier will under which she was sole executrix and residuary beneficiary.

The claims concerning probate and possession of the deceased’s house were consolidated. The issues were whether the deceased had testamentary capacity, whether the 2019 Will was procured by undue influence, and whether it should be admitted to probate.

1. Testamentary capacity. The court applied the four requirements stated in Banks v Goodfellow (1870) LR 5 QB 549: understanding the nature and effect of making a will, the extent of the property, the claims to which effect ought to be given, and the absence of a disorder or delusion affecting the disposition. The question was one of fact, determined from the evidence as a whole.
2. The solicitor’s evidence was given significant weight because he had assessed the deceased, discussed her circumstances and was satisfied that she understood the will. His evidence was not conclusive. The medical records and expert evidence raised a serious question but did not establish incapacity. The golden rule was a matter of good practice and neither compliance nor non-compliance determined validity.
3. The deceased had capacity both when instructing the solicitor and when executing the will. The will was rational on its face, the deceased knew and approved its contents, and it was duly executed and attested under the Wills Act 1837.
4. Undue influence. The equitable doctrine described in Allcard v Skinner (1887) 36 Ch D 145 and Royal Bank of Scotland plc v Etridge (No. 2) [2001] UKHL 44, [2002] 2 AC 773 applies to inter vivos transactions and not to testamentary dispositions. For wills, as explained in Re Edwards (deceased) [2007] EWHC 1119 (Ch), there is no presumption. The challenger bears the burden of proving coercion or fraud, and must show that the facts are inconsistent with any other conclusion.
5. Claire did not establish that Catherine overbore the deceased’s volition or procured the will by fraud or fraudulent calumny. The deceased was vulnerable but retained the ability to form and express her own judgments. The probate claim therefore failed, the 2019 Will was admitted to probate, and Catherine’s possession claim succeeded. Consequential matters were adjourned for a further hearing.