MICHAEL RICHARD LYNCH v WESTMINSTER MAGISTRATES’ COURT

On an application under section 99(4) of the Extradition Act 2003, the judge is the primary decision-maker. The question is whether sufficient reason has been shown for extending the statutory period, rather than whether the Secretary of State’s request was merely rationally open to her. The discretion must reflect the Act’s concurrent objectives: allowing the Secretary of State to determine matters reserved to her while ensuring extradition decisions are made promptly. A judge may require a clear explanation for a substantial extension and may consider the history of the case, including events before it was sent to the Secretary of State, where relevant. The court may refuse an extension without usurping the Secretary of State’s statutory function.

The claimant sought judicial review of District Judge Snow’s decision of 25 November 2021 on the Secretary of State’s application under section 99(4) of the Extradition Act 2003. The Secretary of State sought an extension until 14 March 2022 so that she could consider representations concerning the possible relevance of an anticipated Chancery Division judgment to the specialty bar. The District Judge refused the requested extension but allowed three further weeks, until 16 December 2021.

The claimant argued that the District Judge had applied the wrong test, taken irrelevant matters into account, failed to respect the Secretary of State’s assessment of relevance, and acted irrationally. The central issues were the proper test under section 99(4) and whether the reasons given for refusing the longer extension were lawful.

1. Application dismissed. The District Judge was entitled to refuse the extension sought and to allow only a further three weeks.
2. Section 99(4) of the Extradition Act 2003 makes the judge the primary decision-maker on whether the requested extension should be granted. The judge must decide whether sufficient reason has been shown. The proposed rationality-review test, under which the application would have to be granted whenever the Secretary of State’s request was rationally open to her, was rejected.
3. The statutory scheme pursues concurrent objectives. The Secretary of State decides which matters to consider under section 93, but her decision must ordinarily be made within the required period. Section 99(4) is a derogation from that default timetable and does not confer a wide margin allowing the Secretary of State effectively to control the length of the period.
4. Refusing an extension does not usurp the Secretary of State’s function. It enforces the statutory time limit. A judge may require the Secretary of State to explain clearly why additional time is needed, without directing her what matters she may consider.
5. The District Judge was entitled to take account of the circumstances and history of the case. The absence from section 99(4) of the expression “in the interests of justice”, found in section 75(3), did not require all events before the case was sent to the Secretary of State to be disregarded. Their relevance depends on the circumstances, although events after that date are likely to be most important.
6. The proposed connection between the anticipated civil judgment and the specialty issue had not been sufficiently explained. Factual overlap and common witnesses did not readily explain how the judgment could bear on whether appropriate specialty arrangements existed. The refusal of the substantial extension, and the shorter extension allowing a better-supported application to be made, were rational and lawful.

• District Judge Snow: on 25 November 2021, refused the Secretary of State’s application for an extension under section 99(4) of the Extradition Act 2003 until 14 March 2022, but extended the period to 16 December 2021.
• High Court (Administrative Court): dismissed the judicial review application. Interim extensions made by Chamberlain J remained operative only pending determination of the claim.