JONATHAN DAVID ROWLAND & DAVID JOHN ROWLAND v KEVIN GERALD STANFORD

For civil contempt, the applicant must prove beyond reasonable doubt that the respondent knew of the order, breached it, and knew the facts constituting the breach. Compliance requires performance of the ordered act; a respondent cannot substitute different steps and rely on substantial or purported compliance. A privilege against self-incrimination requires a real and appreciable risk of prosecution. A blanket assertion that disclosure may incriminate the respondent is insufficient, particularly where the relevant offence and risk are not identified. Once knowledge of the order and the relevant acts or omissions is established, it is immaterial that the respondent subjectively believed the order was void or that the conduct was not contemptuous.

The claimants sought findings of contempt against the defendant for deliberate breaches of an order made on 21 April 2021 following Norwich Pharmacal proceedings concerning an electronic archive. The order required the defendant to permit imaging of the archive, provide specified correspondence and communications, and swear an affidavit giving full and accurate details of its provenance and dissemination. It included a limited proviso concerning privilege against self-incrimination in relation to the affidavit.

The defendant supplied alternative electronic materials, failed to provide the ordered documents, and provided an unsworn statement containing limited information and a general assertion of privilege. The central issues were whether he knew of the order, whether his conduct breached it, and whether he knew the facts making his conduct a breach.

1. Liability. The Contempt Application succeeded on all four counts, although Counts 3 and 4 substantially overlapped and represented a single breach of paragraph 3 of the order.
2. The applicable civil contempt requirements were knowledge of the order, conduct or omission involving breach, and knowledge of the facts making that conduct a breach. The claimants bore the criminal burden of proof. Circumstantial evidence could establish contempt, but the court had to reject the allegation where more than one reasonable inference existed and one was inconsistent with contempt.
3. The defendant knew the order. He attended the hearing at which its terms and penal notice were explained, received a sealed copy by email, referred to that copy in his own statement, and sent back a marked-up copy.
4. Paragraph 1 required the claimants’ solicitors to take an image of the archive. Supplying an empty USB drive and later providing materials through hyperlinks did not satisfy that requirement. The ordered imaging process was intended to create a complete and reliable record without possible interference or modification.
5. Paragraph 2 required provision of existing correspondence and communications. No such documents were supplied by the deadline, despite the defendant’s own references showing that responsive material existed. The order contained no privilege proviso for that document-production obligation.
6. Paragraph 3 required a sworn affidavit containing full and accurate details. The defendant’s statement was not an affidavit and left material matters unanswered. His general assertion that disclosure was likely to lead to criminal liability did not establish a real and appreciable risk of prosecution. An adequate invocation would have required either compliance or an explanation identifying the basis of the claimed privilege and the relevant risk.
7. The defendant’s belief that an unrebutted statement had rendered the order void was legally irrelevant. Once knowledge of the order and the relevant acts or omissions was proved, he did not need to know that those acts constituted contempt. In any event, the evidence showed that he appreciated the risk of breach and committal.