SPVRG LTD (R on the application of) v PEMBROKESHIRE COUNTY COUNCIL

On an application under section 73 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990, the local planning authority must consider the conditions governing the new, standalone permission by reference to the current development plan and material considerations. A historic permission will not be an obviously material consideration merely because it forms part of the site’s planning history, particularly where it has been superseded. An established permission may be a fallback carrying substantial weight where there is a real prospect of implementation; that assessment is a matter of planning judgment and is not governed by a formulaic checklist. Planning officers’ reports are read with reasonable benevolence. The court intervenes only where the advice materially misleads the committee. Conflict with individual policies does not necessarily mean conflict with the development plan as a whole.

SPVRG Ltd sought judicial review of Pembrokeshire County Council’s grant of planning permission under section 73 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990. The permission varied conditions concerning twin-unit caravans and the timing and availability of a public car park at an established caravan park near scheduled ancient monuments.

The challenge alleged failure to consider a 1987 permission and associated section 52 agreement, irrational assessment of visual amenity, misapplication of local policy, failure to consider flood risk, improper reliance on the existing permission as a fallback, and failure to apply section 38(6) of the Planning and Compulsory Purchase Act 2004.

1. The claim was dismissed. The Council was not legally obliged to consider the 1987 permission. Whether implemented or not, it had been superseded by the 2016 permission and was therefore spent planning history. The associated agreement was also not a mandatory consideration on the evidence.
2. The Council’s conclusion that the 1987 permission had not been implemented was rational. The permission concerned an industrial heritage project, not a freestanding car park. No applications for the contemplated buildings or other operations had been made, and the existing northern car park materially differed from that envisaged.
3. The agreement’s clause 3(ii) had to be read with the trigger in clause 3(i). The reference to commencement of “any works on site” meant works in furtherance of the industrial heritage project. The evidence did not establish that those works had commenced, so the private-law extinguishment of caravan use had not been triggered.
4. The visual-amenity assessment was lawful and rational. It considered twin-unit, standard single-unit and non-standard single-unit caravans, the approved bases, design parameters and landscaping. The conclusion that the variation would not produce unacceptable visual impact was a permissible exercise of planning judgment.
5. The Officer’s Report properly addressed policy GN.19, including the environmental-improvement criterion, and correctly treated paragraph A as inapplicable because there was no new site or increase in pitches. The Council was entitled to conclude that the proposal accorded with the development plan as a whole despite some conflict with GN.19.
6. Flood risk and TAN 15 were material considerations. Although the report’s wording might have caused concern, the officers corrected the position orally and the committee understood that flood risk required consideration. The weight given to it was rational, including because the variation produced no significant additional effect compared with the implemented permission.
7. The 2016 permission was a realistic fallback carrying substantial weight. The assessment of implementation, including the private lease, possible caravan sizes and car-park arrangements, was lawful. The report also performed the exercise required by section 38(6) of the Planning and Compulsory Purchase Act 2004.