North Warwickshire Borough Council v Sarah Benn

When sentencing for contempt of a civil injunction, the court must consider the objectives of punishment, securing future compliance and rehabilitation. Criminal sentencing guidance may provide a useful analogy, but the court must account for the different maximum sentence and sentencing powers available in civil proceedings. Deliberate breaches should be assessed by culpability and harm, with aggravating and mitigating factors considered. Time already spent in custody must be credited. Where custody exceeds the penalty otherwise warranted, imposing an additional fine may be unjust.

The defendant admitted two breaches of an interim injunction restraining protests at Kingsbury Oil Terminal. The injunction prohibited protest activity within a specified buffer zone and obstructing access to the terminal. The first breach involved protesting within the buffer zone and obstructing the entrance. The second involved further protest activity within the buffer zone and hindering vehicular access.

The court therefore had to determine the appropriate penalties for two admitted contempts, having regard to the defendant’s culpability, the harm caused, aggravating and mitigating circumstances, her means, and time spent in custody.

1. The court was satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that both breaches occurred, relying on the defendant’s admissions and police witness evidence. The defendant had declined legal advice despite being informed of her entitlement to it.
2. In determining the penalty for contempt, the court applied the three objectives identified in Willoughby v Solihull Metropolitan Borough Council [2012] EWCA Civ 699: punishment, securing future compliance and rehabilitation.
3. The criminal Definitive Guideline for breach of a criminal behaviour order was a useful analogy, following Amicus Horizon Ltd v Thorley [2012] EWCA Civ 817. The analogy required caution because the criminal maximum was five years, compared with two years under section 14 of the Contempt of Court Act 1981, and civil courts lacked some criminal sentencing options.
4. Both breaches were deliberate and fell within culpability category B and harm category 3. The second breach was not treated as persistent conduct warranting movement to category A. Aggravating factors included the short period since the injunction, the second breach occurring whilst on bail, and the defendant’s previous convictions. Her strongly held convictions were accepted as the motivation for her conduct. Admissions attracted discounts of 25% and one-third respectively.
5. Absent custody, fines of £900 and £1,200 would have been appropriate. However, the defendant had spent eight days in custody, equivalent to a 16-day custodial term. As that custody was more severe than the breaches warranted, it would be unjust to impose further fines. No order was made on the breaches.
6. There was no order as to costs because the claimant had failed to provide a costs schedule, depriving the court of information needed for summary assessment.