Steven Lee Woodger v Reece Hallas

Under Criminal Justice and Courts Act 2015, s 57, a claimant who is fundamentally dishonest in a personal injury claim must ordinarily lose the entire claim, including honest elements. Substantial injustice requires more than the loss of genuine damages, because that loss is the statutory consequence of fundamental dishonesty. The relevant injustice must be substantial and personal to the claimant. Serious injuries, the existence of an honest part of the claim, or care provided by others do not, without more, satisfy the exception. The court may consider the nature, duration and extent of the dishonesty and balance those matters against any substantial injustice. On dismissal, the court must record the damages that would otherwise have been awarded and apply that figure when assessing costs.

The claimant brought a personal injury claim arising from a road traffic accident for which liability was admitted. The County Court found that he had fundamentally dishonestly exaggerated his symptoms and concealed earnings, particularly in relation to a substantial loss of earnings claim.

The trial judge awarded £49,415 for non-earnings-related losses, declined to dismiss the claim under s 57(2) of the Criminal Justice and Courts Act 2015, and made a limited costs order. The defendant appealed, challenging the finding of substantial injustice and the consequential damages and costs approach. The central issue was whether the entire claim should have been dismissed despite the claimant’s genuine injuries and recoverable losses.

1. Appeal allowed. The claimant’s entire claim was dismissed under s 57(2) of the Criminal Justice and Courts Act 2015 because the finding of fundamental dishonesty was rightly made and the statutory exception was not established.
2. Section 57 applies only where the claimant is genuinely entitled to damages. Accordingly, the fact that dismissal deprives the claimant of genuine damages cannot itself constitute substantial injustice. That is the ordinary statutory consequence and must mean something more.
3. The trial judge’s two reasons were insufficient. The existence of an honest part of the claim conflicted with the statutory scheme and the reasoning in London Organising Committee of the Olympic and Paralympic Games v Sinfield and Iddon v Warner. Reliance on care provided by others was also inconsistent with s 57(2), which focuses on injustice suffered by the claimant.
4. The claimant’s serious injuries, continuing symptoms and the asserted need for the defendant to pay compensation did not establish substantial injustice. Applying the approach in Iddon v Warner, the sustained dishonesty, its duration and the claimant’s involvement of others would have outweighed any injustice even if some injustice had been shown.
5. The separate costs ground fell away because the defendant was entitled to its costs following dismissal. Under ss 57(4) and (5), the court had to record the damages that would have been awarded but for dismissal and deduct that amount from the costs payable by the claimant. The correct recorded figure was £74,460, being the trial judge’s initial assessment before the disputed reductions. The court left open whether the trial judge had power to reduce that figure.

• High Court (Queen's Bench Division): Appeal from the judgment of His Honour Judge Godsmark QC in the County Court at Derby dated 25 June 2021. The appeal was allowed and the entire claim dismissed under s 57(2) of the Criminal Justice and Courts Act 2015.