PATRYK WASIELYSZYN v REGIONAL COURT IN RADOM, POLAND

Where the requesting judicial authority withdraws the European arrest warrant on which extradition was ordered, the court should discharge the requested person and quash the extradition order under section 42(3)(a) of the Extradition Act 2003.

The court may record material circumstances concerning the extradition proceedings, including apparent disclosure failures and inconsistencies in the requesting authority’s information. It need not, however, require or urge voluntary disclosure in proceedings that have ended. Any applicable duty of candour will arise in the context of later extradition or other legal proceedings, where the relevant safeguards can be invoked and enforced.

The appellant faced extradition to Poland in relation to four matters, including convictions for robbery, passport offending and theft, and an accusation of theft. A district judge ordered extradition on three matters and discharged the appellant on the passport-offending matter. The appellant appealed, raising limitation, human-rights and possible abuse-of-process issues, while fresh evidence and further information were examined.

During the adjourned appeal hearing, the Polish judicial authority withdrew the European arrest warrant of 28 April 2010 and requested that the appellant be discharged and the extradition order quashed. The appellant accepted that outcome but sought recitals recording the surrounding circumstances and directions encouraging voluntary disclosure concerning the withdrawal, its timing and a further warrant. The central issues were the statutory consequence of withdrawal and whether further disclosure directions were appropriate.

1. Disposition. The court acceded to the common position under section 42(3)(a) of the Extradition Act 2003. The appellant was discharged and the order for his extradition was quashed.
2. Material circumstances. The court recorded, in outline, that limitation periods had expired or were potentially material; that a formal Polish decision of 29 April 2015 had apparently revoked extradition in relation to two matters; that relevant further information and warrants had not been disclosed to the appellant or the court at earlier stages; and that conflicting information had been provided about whether the 2010 warrant had been withdrawn or replaced. These matters were recorded to explain the position and the appellant’s concerns.
3. Disclosure request. The appellant invited the court to urge voluntary disclosure concerning the basis and timing of the withdrawal and disclosure of the 2015 warrant. The court considered that recording the key circumstances was appropriate and sufficient. It declined to exercise any jurisdiction to make an order urging voluntary disclosure.
4. Duty of candour. If proceedings were later brought against the appellant with a view to seeking extradition, or if another legal proceeding arose, any applicable duty of candour would be engaged in that context. The persons responsible for applying or policing the relevant legal standards and safeguards would then be informed by the circumstances recorded in this judgment.
5. The final order was therefore limited to discharge and quashing the extradition order, without requiring further information or explanation from the respondent at that stage.

The judgment describes an appeal from an extradition order made by DJ Roscoe. Extradition had been ordered on three matters, with discharge on the passport-offending matter. Permission to appeal was refused on the papers, and a renewed application was later adjourned for further information. The present court then ordered discharge and quashed the extradition order after the requesting authority withdrew the relevant warrant.