TV HARRISON CIC v LEEDS CITY COUNCIL

A local planning authority must have regard to every development-plan policy directly relevant to the proposed development. Overlap with national policy or another development-plan document does not discharge that obligation where the policies differ in substance or status.

Whether development-plan policies conflict, whether land is surplus to requirements, and whether a planning condition secures adequate replacement provision are ordinarily matters of planning judgment, reviewable only for irrationality. A decision-maker may give genuinely alternative reasons, provided the routes are materially independent. Where permission is granted despite a statutory consultee’s reasoned objection, reasons may be required, and an officers’ report can supply them. Relief should not be refused unless it is highly likely that a lawful approach would have made no substantial difference.

The claimant challenged Leeds City Council’s decision to grant itself outline planning permission for up to 61 affordable dwellings on a site identified as a protected playing pitch. The challenge concerned the failure to address retained policy N6 of the Leeds Unitary Development Plan, the treatment of the site as surplus under paragraph 99(a) of the National Planning Policy Framework, the adequacy of reasons, and the effect of a planning condition intended to secure replacement sports provision under paragraph 99(b).

Permission had been granted on Grounds 1 and 3. Permission on Grounds 2 and 4 had initially been refused, and the claimant renewed those applications. The court therefore had to determine whether the decision was lawful, whether reasons were required and adequate, and whether relief should be withheld under section 31(2A) of the Senior Courts Act 1981.

1. Ground 1 succeeded. Policy N6 remained part of the development plan and was directly relevant because the proposal involved developing a protected playing pitch. The officers’ report did not mention it and omitted it from the list of relevant retained policies.
2. The overlap between policy N6, the site requirement in the Site Allocations Plan and paragraph 99 of the National Planning Policy Framework did not cure the omission. Policy N6 required a demonstrable net gain in both overall pitch quality and provision, whereas paragraph 99(b) required equivalent provision. Policy N6 also emphasised suitable relocation within the same locality of the city. Those were substantive differences, and policy N6 had the legal status of a development-plan policy.
3. Ground 3 failed. It was open to the Council, as a matter of planning judgment, to conclude that a playing field of sufficiently poor quality added nothing to meeting local need and was surplus to requirements. It was also open to it to rely on the 2011 assessment without obtaining a further assessment. Those conclusions were not irrational. The alleged deficiency in outdoor-sports green space did not amount to a material misleading of the Panel or reopen the earlier allocation in the development plan.
4. Grounds 2 and 4 were refused permission. The Council had a common-law duty to give reasons because it granted permission despite Sport England’s fully reasoned objection as statutory consultee. The officers’ report could discharge that duty. It adequately explained the principal issues and the Council’s approach to paragraph 99 and Sport England’s objection.
5. Alternative reasoning was legitimate. A planning authority may rely on genuinely different routes to the same conclusion. The Panel was taken to have adopted the officers’ reasoning in its entirety. An error in one route would not invalidate the decision if an independent alternative route remained sound.
6. The adequacy of condition 9 and the conclusion that paragraph 99(b) was satisfied were matters of planning judgment. The condition imposed significant restrictions and it was not irrational to regard it as adequate.
7. Relief was granted. Section 31(2A) of the Senior Courts Act 1981 did not apply. The court could not be satisfied that it was highly likely that the outcome would have been substantially the same had policy N6 been considered. Lawful consideration might have produced materially different requirements for replacement playing pitches. The decision was quashed.