Anna Christie v The Mary Ward Legal Centre & Anor

In a professional negligence claim, limitation begins when the claimant suffers real damage that falls within the applicable measure of damages. The inquiry is fact-sensitive. Minimal expense, inconvenience or procedural disadvantage does not necessarily constitute actionable damage.

Where the alleged negligence concerns loss of a right or remedy, the cause of action may accrue when that right is lost or materially impaired, rather than when earlier steps create only a theoretical or trivial disadvantage. A preserved right to obtain relief may therefore prevent limitation from running until the right is irreversibly lost. The court must identify when the claimant first became materially worse off because of the negligence.

The claimant brought a professional negligence claim against a legal centre and counsel concerning advice given during forfeiture proceedings relating to her long leasehold property.

She alleged that negligent advice caused her to sell the property, instead of seeking relief from forfeiture by securing the service-charge arrears as a charge or loan against it. The defendants applied to strike out or obtain summary judgment on limitation grounds, arguing that damage arose before the sale, including when a possession order was made, costs were incurred or preparatory steps for sale began.

The issue was when the cause of action accrued under section 2 of the Limitation Act.

1. Application refused in relation to limitation. The claim was issued on 15 July 2019 and was arguably brought within six years of the end of July 2013, when the sale contracts were exchanged and the claimant irreversibly lost the right to seek relief on the terms alleged.
2. The accrual of damage in professional negligence is fact-sensitive. The claimant must have suffered real damage, rather than merely minimal damage. Actual damage must also fall within the measure of damages applicable to the wrong.
3. The earlier possession order did not cause the sale or materially diminish the claimant’s right to seek relief. The order preserved her right to apply for relief until 9 August 2013 and suspended possession if such an application was made.
4. Any earlier costs, adjournments, inconvenience and preparatory conveyancing expense were, at most, minimal or trivial in comparison with the claimed loss. They did not establish that the right to relief had been materially impaired. The court also doubted whether such costs fell within the applicable measure of damages.
5. The material loss was the loss of the right to obtain relief by charging the arrears against the property. That right remained available until the sale contracts were exchanged, effectively at the end of July 2013. The lease’s earlier technical forfeiture was not the relevant event for this negligence claim.
6. The approach was consistent with Berney v Saul, [2013] PNLR 26, and Hopkins v MacKenzie, [1994] PIQR 43. The court distinguished the reasoning relied on from Capita (Banstead 2011) Ltd v RFIB Group Ltd, [2016] QB 835, because the present claim concerned continuing negligent advice and the eventual loss of the right to seek relief.
7. The court held that it was not fanciful to argue that the claim was in time. The limitation issue could not properly dispose of the claim at this stage.

First-instance decision. The judgment itself records no prior appellate decision in the same litigation.