James Cropper Plc & Anor v Aviva Life and Pensions UK Limited

For limitation purposes, a claimant may rely on Limitation Act 1980 section 14A where it has a realistic case that the relevant knowledge was acquired only later, particularly where the defendant’s continuing administration and advice reasonably obscured the earlier breach. Section 14B requires identification of a negligent act or omission within the applicable long-stop period, but later acts may support a claim for loss flowing from them. A later statement repeating an earlier erroneous assumption may be a continuation of the same breach and damage rather than a new cause of action. Whether an amended pleading adds a new cause of action depends on the essential facts, duties, breaches and damage alleged.

The claim arose from the administration of an occupational pension scheme and alleged negligent advice and services concerning equalisation of male and female normal retirement dates following Barber. The claimants alleged that the scheme administrator wrongly treated an October 1995 announcement as effective equalisation, causing the Barber Window to remain open until a deed executed in December 2002.

Aviva applied to strike out the claim and obtain summary judgment on limitation grounds. The claimants relied on sections 14A and 32 of the Limitation Act 1980. They also sought permission to amend the particulars to plead further acts, including actuarial reports and a retainer continuing until 2008. The central issues were whether the claims had a realistic limitation case and whether the proposed amendments introduced new causes of action.

1. Strike out and summary judgment. The applications were dismissed. Applying Easyair, the claimants had a realistic, rather than fanciful, prospect of establishing that they first acquired the knowledge required by section 14A during 2017. Friends Life had drafted the relevant documentation, participated in the 1995 announcement and thereafter administered the Scheme on the assumption that equalisation had occurred. The comprehensive 2002 deed and rules also made it particularly unlikely that later trustees or advisers would discover the earlier defect.
2. Section 14B created a 15-year long-stop ending on 15 December 2002, subject to concealment. There was no specific duty to advise during the four days before execution of the 2002 deed, and the claim concerning the altered amendment power pleaded no resulting loss. However, the existing pleading sufficiently covered later negligent acts, including the 2003 actuarial valuation report, which repeated the erroneous statement that equalisation had occurred in 1995. Such acts could support recovery of loss flowing from them.
3. The court rejected the submission that the claimants had suffered only contingent loss until 2017. Law Society v Sephton & Co concerned exposure to discretionary future claims. Here the alleged loss arose from legal obligations under the Scheme documentation.
4. The concealment plea under section 32 was weak, since the change to the amendment power and the deeming provision did not establish deliberate concealment. Nevertheless, it was not struck out before disclosure because the applications had been advanced on an all-or-nothing basis and the claim had to proceed in any event. Entrust’s short period as trustee did not reset limitation; earlier trustees’ knowledge or reasonable diligence remained relevant.
5. Amendments. Applying the four-stage approach in Hyde v Nygate, the amendments were plainly outside the primary limitation period, but they did not add a new cause of action. They concerned the same retainer, duties, breaches and damage. The later actuarial reports repeated the same erroneous assumption, unlike the independent valuation exercise considered in Ballinger v Mercer Ltd. Permission to amend was therefore granted under CPR 17.1(2)(b), alternatively because any assumed new claim arose from the same or substantially the same facts.
6. Aviva’s strike-out and summary-judgment application was dismissed. The claimants’ amendment application was allowed.

First-instance decision. No appellate history is stated in the judgment.