LINDA LU v SOLICITORS REGULATION AUTHORITY

Final decisions on anonymity and redaction engage open justice and are appealable, rather than being merely administrative case-management decisions. On an appeal concerning open justice, the appellate court must itself ensure the proper balance between privacy rights under article 8 and reporting rights under article 10, while respecting the lower tribunal’s assessment. An acquittal does not ordinarily justify anonymity. Relevant allegations and social-media material may properly remain in a published judgment where they provide context or are admissible, absent adequate cause for suppression. Anonymity for third parties requires a fact-specific justification. Courts should not impose it unasked merely because individuals are unrepresented or allegations have been made against them.

The appellant appealed under section 49(1) of the Solicitors Act 1974 against decisions of the Solicitors Disciplinary Tribunal concerning anonymity, private hearings and redaction. The tribunal had acquitted her of misconduct but published her name, while anonymising two law firms, several individuals, a barrister and an expert witness. The appeal raised whether the anonymity and redaction decisions were appealable, whether the tribunal had properly balanced open justice against privacy and Convention rights, whether relevant employment and social-media material should have been withheld, and whether the third-party anonymity orders were justified.

1. Jurisdiction. The appeal was competent. The tribunal’s final decisions on anonymity and redaction were orders within sections 48(1) and 49(1) of the Solicitors Act 1974. The list in section 47(2)(a)–(i) was not exhaustive. The decisions were matters of open justice and human rights, not ordinary case management decisions. The application to strike out under CPR rule 52.18 was refused.
2. Applicable approach. The appellate court had its own duty to conduct the appeal openly and to uphold the competing rights under articles 8 and 10 of the Convention. The high, near-Wednesbury threshold proposed by the respondent was rejected. Respect was due to the tribunal’s evaluation, but the court had to intervene if the balance was clearly wrong, applying CPR rule 39.2.
3. Appellant’s identity and material. Applying the reasoning in Solicitors Regulation Authority v Spector [2016] 4 WLR 16, the appellant’s acquittal did not defeat open justice. The employment allegations supplied context and possible motive for both the prosecution case and the defence. They were admissible and could properly be included. The social-media material was also properly published. The appellant had voluntarily placed personal information in a semi-public domain, and relevant electronic communications may become public when admitted in litigation.
4. Third-party anonymity. Grounds 10 and 13 succeeded. The tribunal had acted without a proper fact-specific assessment, without clear findings of exceptional hardship or prejudice, and without distinguishing between firms, witnesses and persons against whom allegations had been made. The unasked-for anonymity orders were unjustified. The court nevertheless retained anonymity for Persons A, B and C because of their possible contractual rights.
5. The proposed procedural-irregularity ground was refused because it was very late, prejudicial and unlikely to have merit. Permission to advance the costs ground was also refused. The appeal succeeded in part, but no further relief was necessary; on all other grounds it was dismissed.

• Solicitors Disciplinary Tribunal: acquitted the appellant of both misconduct allegations, made no order as to costs, published a redacted judgment, named the appellant and anonymised other persons and firms.
• High Court (Administrative Court): appeal allowed on the grounds concerning inconsistent treatment and unjustified third-party anonymity. No further relief was ordered. All other grounds were dismissed or permission to amend was refused.